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Another Look at the Design
Features of Human Language
by Daniel L. Everett
The Piraha˜ language challenges simplistic application of Hock-
ett’s nearly universally accepted design features of human lan-
guage by showing that some of these features (interchangeability,
displacement, and productivity) may be culturally constrained. In
particular, Piraha˜ culture constrains communication to nonab-
stract subjects which fall within the immediate experience of in-
terlocutors. This constraint explains a number of very surprising
features of Piraha˜ grammar and culture: the absence of numbers
of any kind or a concept of counting and of any terms for quanti-
fication, the absence of color terms, the absence of embedding,
the simplest pronoun inventory known, the absence of “relative
tenses,” the simplest kinship system yet documented, the ab-
sence of creation myths and fiction, the absence of any individ-
ual or collective memory of more than two generations past, the
absence of drawing or other art and one of the simplest material
cultures documented, and the fact that the Piraha˜ are monolin-
gual after more than 200 years of regular contact with Brazilians
and the Tupi-Guarani-speaking Kawahiv.
d a n i e l l . e v e r e t t is Professor of Phonetics and Phonology
in the Department of Linguistics at the University of Manches-
ter (Manchester M13 9PL, U.K. [dan.everett@manchester.ac.uk]).
Born in 1951, he received a Sc.D. from the State University of
Campinas, Brazil, in 1983 and has taught linguistics there
(1981–86) and at the University of Pittsburgh (1988–99). His
publications include A lingua piraha˜ e a teoria da sintaxe (Cam-
pinas: Editora da UNICAMP, 1992), (with Barbara Kern) Wari’
Descriptive Grammar (London: Routledge, 1997), and “Coherent
Fieldwork,” in Linguistics Today, edited by Piet van Sterkenberg
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004). The present paper was sub-
mitted 12 iv 04 and accepted 4 iii 05.
[Supplementary material appears in the electronic edition of this
issue on the journal’s web page (http://www.journals.uchicago.
edu/CA/home.html).]
It does not seem likely . . . that there is any direct
relation between the culture of a tribe and the lan-
guage they speak, except in so far as the form of the
language will be moulded by the state of the cul-
ture, but not in so far as a certain state of the cul-
ture is conditioned by the morphological traits of
the language.
frans boas , 1911
In the early days of American descriptive linguistics, lan-
guage was seen as an emergent property of human cul-
ture and psychology.1 Except for small pockets of re-
searchers here and there, for various reasons both
so-called formal and functional linguistics abandoned
the investigation of culture-language connections.2 In re-
cent years there has been a welcome revival of interest
in the influence of language on culture and cognition,
especially in more sophisticated investigations of the lin-
guistic-relativity/determinism hypothesis (e.g., Lucy
1. I thank the Piraha˜ for their friendship and help for more than
half of my life. Since 1977 the people have taught me about their
language and way of understanding the world. I have lived for over
six years in Piraha˜ villages and have visited the people every year
since 1977. I speak the language well and can say anything I need
to say in it, subject to the kinds of limitations discussed in this
paper. I have not published on Piraha˜ culture per se, but I have
observed it closely for all of these years and have discussed most
of my observations, including those reported on here, with the Pir-
aha˜ themselves. My wife, Keren, is the only non-Piraha˜ to have
lived longer among the Piraha˜ than I. She has offered invaluable
help, strong criticism, and inspiration in my studies of the Piraha˜
language over the years. Peter Gordon’s enthusiasm for studying
Piraha˜ counting experimentally has challenged me to consider the
absence of Piraha˜ numerals in a wider cultural and linguistic con-
text. I thank David Gil of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology in Leipzig for organizing the “Numerals” conference
there (March 28 and 29, 2004) and the Institute’s Linguistics De-
partment for offering me ideal circumstances in which to rough
out the bulk of this paper. I also thank (in no particular order) Ray
Jackendoff, Lila Gleitman, Timothy Feist, Bill Poser, Nigel Vincent,
Keren Everett, Arlo Heinrichs, Steve Sheldon, Pattie Epps, Tony
Woodbury, Brent Berlin, Tom Headland, Terry Kaufman, Grev Cor-
bett, Peter Gordon, Sally Thomason, Alec Marantz, Donca Steriade,
Craige Roberts, Mary Beckman, Peter Culicover, and Iris Berent for
comments of varying detail on this paper and Paul Kay for asking
challenging questions about my statements on color terms that
helped me sharpen my thinking about this enormously. Tom Head-
land deserves special mention for giving me detailed help on how
to make my ethnographic summary more intelligible to anthro-
pologists. This paper supersedes any other published or unpublished
statement by me on those aspects of Piraha˜ grammar here ad-
dressed. No one should draw the conclusion from this paper that
the Piraha˜ language is in any way “primitive.” It has the most
complex verbal morphology I am aware of and a strikingly complex
prosodic system. The Piraha˜ are some of the brightest, pleasantest,
most fun-loving people that I know. The absence of formal fiction,
myths, etc., does not mean that they do not or cannot joke or lie,
both of which they particularly enjoy doing at my expense, always
good-naturedly. Questioning Piraha˜’s implications for the design
features of human language is not at all equivalent to questioning
their intelligence or the richness of their cultural experience and
knowledge.
2. It is ironic that linguists of the “functional” persuasion should
ignore culture’s potential impact on grammar, given the fact that
functional linguistics inherited from generative semantics the view
that form is driven largely by meaning (and, more recently, by gen-
eral cognitive constraints as well) because the locus and source of
meaning for any human are principally in the culture.
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1992a, b; Gumperz and Levinson 1996; Gentner and Gol-
din-Meadow 2003). However, there has been insufficient
work on the constraints that culture can place on major
grammatical structures in a language, though Pawley
(1987) and the contributors to Enfield (2002), among oth-
ers, have produced some important results.
This paper looks in detail at various aspects of the
culture and language of the Piraha˜ of Brazil that suggest
that Piraha˜ culture severely constrains Piraha˜ grammar
in several ways, producing an array of otherwise inex-
plicable “gaps” in Piraha˜ morphosyntax. These con-
straints lead to the startling conclusion that Hockett’s
(1960) design features of human language, even more
widely accepted among linguists than Chomsky’s pro-
posed universal grammar, must be revised. With respect
to Chomsky’s proposal, the conclusion is severe—some
of the components of so-called core grammar are subject
to cultural constraints, something that is predicted not
to occur by the universal-grammar model. I argue that
these apparently disjointed facts about the Piraha˜ lan-
guage—gaps that are very surprising from just about any
grammarian’s perspective—ultimately derive from a sin-
gle cultural constraint in Piraha˜, namely, the restriction
of communication to the immediate experience of the
interlocutors.
Grammar and other ways of living are restricted to
concrete, immediate experience (where an experience is
immediate in Piraha˜ if it has been seen or recounted as
seen by a person alive at the time of telling), and im-
mediacy of experience is reflected in immediacy of in-
formation encoding—one event per utterance.3 Less ex-
plicitly, the paper raises the possibility, subject to further
research, that culture constrains cognition as well. If the
assertion of cultural constraint is correct, then it has
important consequences for the enterprise of linguistics.
Before beginning in earnest, I should say something
about my distinction between “culture” and “language.”
To linguists this is a natural distinction. To anthropol-
ogists it is not. My own view of the relationship is that
the anthropological perspective is the more useful, but
that is exactly what this paper purports to show. There-
fore, although I begin with what will strike most an-
thropologists as a strange division between the form of
communication (language) and the ways of meaning (cul-
ture) from which it emerges, my conclusion is that the
division is not in fact a very useful one and that Sapir,
Boas, and the anthropological tradition generally have
this right. In this sense, this paper may be taken as an
argument that anthropology and linguistics are more
closely aligned than most modern linguists (whether
“functional” or “formal”) suppose.
This study began as a description of the absence of
numerals, number, and counting in Piraha˜, the only sur-
3. The notion of “event” used in this paper—a single logical pred-
icate—comes from the standard literature on lexical semantics.
Such predicates can be modified but are represented as solitary
events (see Van Valin and LaPolla 1997 for one model). This is not
to say that a single event cannot be expressed by more than one
utterance but merely that multiple events are not expressed in a
single utterance/sentence.
viving member of the Muran language family. However,
after considering the implications of this unusual feature
of Piraha˜ language and culture, I came to the conclusion
defended in this paper, namely, that there is an important
relation between the absence of number, numerals, and
counting, on the one hand, and the striking absence of
other forms of precision quantification in Piraha˜ seman-
tics and culture, on the other. A summary of the sur-
prising facts will include at least the following: Piraha˜
is the only language known without number, numerals,
or a concept of counting. It also lacks terms for quan-
tification such as “all,” “each,” “every,” “most,” and
“some.” It is the only language known without color
terms. It is the only language known without embedding
(putting one phrase inside another of the same type or
lower level, e.g., noun phrases in noun phrases, sentences
in sentences, etc.). It has the simplest pronoun inventory
known, and evidence suggests that its entire pronominal
inventory may have been borrowed. It has no perfect
tense. It has perhaps the simplest kinship system ever
documented. It has no creation myths—its texts are al-
most always descriptions of immediate experience or in-
terpretations of experience; it has some stories about the
past, but only of one or two generations back. Piraha˜ in
general express no individual or collective memory of
more than two generations past. They do not draw, ex-
cept for extremely crude stick figures representing the
spirit world that they (claim to) have directly exper-
ienced.
In addition, the following facts provide additional
overt evidence for ways in which culture can be causally
implicated in the linguistic structure of the language:
The phonemic inventory of Piraha˜ women is the small-
est in the world, with only seven consonants and three
vowels, while the men’s inventory is tied with Rotokas
and Hawaiian for the next-smallest inventory, with only
eight consonants and three vowels (Everett 1979). The
Piraha˜ people communicate almost as much by singing,
whistling, and humming as they do using consonants
and vowels (Everett 1985, 2004). Piraha˜ prosody is very
rich, with a well-documented five-way weight distinc-
tion between syllable types (Everett 1979, 1988; Everett
and Everett 1984).
A final fascinating feature of Piraha˜ culture, which I
will argue to follow from the above, is that Piraha˜ con-
tinue to be monolingual in Piraha˜ after more than 200
years of regular contact with Brazilians and other non-
Piraha˜. What we will see as the discussion progresses is
that Portuguese grammar and communication violate
the Piraha˜ cultural constraint on grammar and living, a
profound cultural value, leading to an explanation for
this persistent monolingualism.
Any of these properties is sufficiently unusual in itself
to demand careful consideration, but their manifestation
in a single language suggests the existence of a common
unifying generalization behind them. They are suffi-
ciently disparate formally (i.e., in terms of potential
phrase-structure realizations) that any unifying principle
is almost certainly to be found in their meaning, and
that in the broadest sense of a constraint on cultural
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function. What I propose, again, is that Piraha˜ culture
avoids talking about knowledge that ranges beyond per-
sonal, usually immediate experience or is transmitted
via such experience. All of the properties of Piraha˜ gram-
mar that I have listed will be shown to follow from this.
Abstract entities are not bound by immediate personal
experience, and therefore Piraha˜ people do not discuss
them.
In developing the arguments to support these theses,
I also argue against the simple Whorfian idea that lin-
guistic relativity or determinism alone can account for
the facts under consideration. In fact, I also argue that
the unidirectionality inherent in linguistic relativity of-
fers an insufficient tool for language-cognition connec-
tions more generally in that it fails to recognize the fun-
damental role of culture in shaping language. In what
follows I describe the properties of Piraha˜ grammar men-
tioned above, consider the facts in light of Piraha˜ cultural
values, and discuss the lessons to be drawn from the case
of Piraha˜ for linguistic theory. I do not claim that my
thesis or its relation to the facts has been proven; rather,
I suggest that the relation has been supported and that
there is no other obvious relation. Any other approach
would render the above-mentioned observations coin-
cidental.
Number, Numerals, and Counting
There is no grammatical number in Piraha˜ (Everett 1983,
1986; Corbett 2000). There are therefore no number con-
trasts on nouns, pronouns, verbs, or modifiers for number
( p high tone; no mark over vowel p low tone; ’ p´
glottal stop):
1. hiaitı´ihı´ hi kaoa´ı´bogi bai -aaga´
Piraha˜ people he evil spirit fear -be
“The Piraha˜ are afraid of evil spirits,” “A Piraha˜ is
afraid of an evil spirit,” “The Piraha˜ are afraid of an
evil spirit,” or “ A Piraha˜ is afraid of evil spirits.”
2. ko´’oı´, ko´hoibiı´hai, hi pı´ai, ’aa´ibı´gaı´,
name name he also, name
hi pı´ai, hi koaba´ipı´
he also, he die
“Ko´’oı´, Ko´hoibiı´hai, and ’aa´ibigaı´ died.”
3. ko´’oı´ hi koaba´ipı´
name he die
“Ko´’oı´ died.”
4. ba´igipo´hoaa´ ’i ’o´ooı´ kobai -baaı´
name:feminine she tarantula watch -intently
“Ba´igipo´hoaa´ watched the tarantula[s] closely.” (This
can refer to one woman named “Ba´igipo´hoaa´” or
several.)
This feature of Piraha˜ is itself very rare (see Corbett
2000:50). There may be no other language that lacks the
grammatical category of number.
There are three words in Piraha˜ that are easy to confuse
with numerals because they can be translated as nu-
merals in some of their uses:4 ho´i ‘small size or amount’,
hoı´ ‘somewhat larger size or amount’, and ba´ a gi so lit.
‘cause to come together’ (loosely ‘many’). Some examples
which show how Piraha˜ expresses what in other cultures
would be numerical concepts are as follows:
5. a. tı´ ’ı´tı´i’isi ho´i hii ’aba’a´ı´gio ’oogabagaı´
I fish small predicate only want
“I only want [one/a couple/a small] fish.” (This
could not be used to express a desire for one
fish that was very large except as a joke.)
b. tioba´hai ho´i hii
child small predicate
”small child/child is small/one child”
6. a. tı´ ’ı´tı´i’isi hoı´ hii ’oogabagaı´
I fish larger predicate want
“I want [a few/larger/several] fish.”
b. tı´ ’ı´tı´i’isi ba´agiso ’oogabagaı´
I fish many/group want
“I want [a group of/many] fish.”
c. tı´ ’ı´tı´i’isi ’ogiı´ ’oogabagaı´
I fish big want
“I want [a big/big pile of/many] fish.”
Interestingly, in spite of its lack of number and nu-
merals, Piraha˜ superficially appears to have a count-ver-
sus-mass distinction (examples preceded by an asterisk are
ungrammatical, and those preceded by a question mark
would be considered strange):
7. a. ’aoo´i ’aaı´ba´i ’ao’aaga´ ’oı´ kapio´’io
foreigner many exist jungle other
“There are many foreigners in another jungle.”
b. ∗/? ’aoo´i ’apagı´ ’ao’aaga´ ’oı´ kapio´’io
foreigner much exist jungle other
?”There are much foreigners in another jungle.”
8. a. ’agaı´si ’apagı´ ’ao’aaga´ ’oı´ kapio´’io
manioc meal much exist jungle other
“There is a lot of manioc meal in another jungle.”
b. ∗’agaı´si ’aaı´ba´i ’ao’aaga´ ’oı´ kapio´’io
manioc meal many exist jungle other
∗“There is many manioc meal in another jungle.”
This distinction is more consistently analyzed, how-
ever, as the distinction between things that can be in-
dividuated and things that cannot, thus independent of
the notion of counting.
There are likewise no ordinal numbers in Piraha˜. Some
of the functions of ordinals are expressed via body parts,
in a way familiar to many languages:
4. The “translation fallacy” is well-known, but field linguists in
particular must be ever-vigilant not to be confused by it. Bruner,
Brockmeier, and Harre´ (2001:39) describe it as the supposition that
there is only one human reality to which all “narratives”—be they
fiction or linguistic theories, say—must in effect conform.
Throughout this paper I will urge the reader to be on guard against
this—the mistake of concluding that language X shares a category
with language Y if the categories overlap in reference.
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9. ti ’apaı´ ka´obı´i ’ahaigı´
I head fall same generation
hi tı´ohio´’ı´o/gaaba ka´obı´i
he towards me/there stay fall
“I was born first then my sibling was born.” (lit.
“I head fall sibling to me/there at fall.”)
The expressions tı´ohio´’ı´o and gaaba here are inter-
changeable in most contexts. They refer both to inter-
mediate points in a succession of participants, events,
etc., or to the final position. But the word “head” does
not really mean “first,” not if we assume that “first”
derives its meaning partially in opposition to “second,”
“third,” etc., but overlaps with “first” in referring to
something at the beginning of a spatial or temporal
sequence.5
The Piraha˜ language has no words for individual fin-
gers (e.g., “ring finger,” “index finger,” “thumb,” etc.).
Piraha˜ occasionally refer to their fingers collectively as
“hand sticks,” but only when asked by an insistent lin-
guist. By the same reasoning, there is no word for “last.”
Moreover, they tend not to point with individual fingers,
at least when talking to me. Commonly, if they use any
part of their arms for pointing, they tend to extend a flat
hand turned sideways or an open palm facing up or down.
More often, they point, as is common around the world,
with their lower lip or jaw or a motion of the head. When
discussing a large quantity/number of objects, they do
not make tallying motions on individual appendages. If
they use gestures, they hold the flat hand out, palm
down, varying the distance between hand and ground to
indicate the size of the “pile” or amount under discus-
sion. However, a seated Piraha˜ man or woman (though
women rarely do this) will occasionally extend both feet
and hands, with toes and fingers also extended, to in-
dicate a large number of individual items (they would
do this in my experience not for a nonindividuated quan-
tity such as manioc flour but rather for bags of manioc
flour, etc.). Other than these gestures, there is no use of
body parts, objects, or anything to indicate a concept of
“tallying.”
There are no quantifier terms like “all,” “each,” “ev-
ery,” “most,” and “few” in Piraha˜. There are also no
“WH (information question)-quantifiers” per se.6 The
following examples show the closest expressions Piraha˜
can muster to these quantifiers:
10. hiaitı´ihı´ hi ’ogi -’a´aga
Piraha˜ people he big -be (permanence)
-o´ pi -o´ kaobı´i
-direction water -direction entered
5. Part of the conclusion of this paper, agreeing with Gordon (2004),
is that much of Piraha˜ is largely incommensurate with English and
therefore translation is simply a poor approximation of Piraha˜ in-
tentions and meaning, but we do as well as we can do.
6. One reviewer has suggested that these Piraha˜ words are quantifier
words but have different truth conditions from their English coun-
terparts. But having different truth conditions simply means having
different meanings in this context, and therefore if they have dif-
ferent truth conditions then they are different words.
“All the people went to swim/went swimming/are
swimming/bathing, etc.”
11. ti ’ogi -’a´aga




-direction she eat -intensive
koga ho´i hi





“We ate most of the fish.” (lit. “My bigness ate
[at] a bigness of fish, nevertheless there was a
smallness we did not eat.”)
The following is the closest I have ever been able to get
to a sentence that would substitute for a quantifier like
“each,” as in “Each man went to the field.”
12. ’igihı´ hi ’ogia´agao´ ’oga
man he bigness field
ha´piı´; ’aika´ibaı´si, ’ahoa´a´pati pı´o,
went name, name also,
tı´igi hi pı´o, ’ogia´agao´
name he also bigness
“The men all went to the field, ’aika´ibaı´si, ’ahoa´a´-
pati, tı´igi all went.”
13. ga´ta -hai ho´i hi -i
can -foreign object small intensive -be
’aba -’a´ -ı´gi -o
remain -temporary -associative -location
’ao -aaga´ ’agaoa ko -o´
possession -be (temporary) canoe gut -direction
“There were [a] few cans in the foreigner’s canoe.”
(lit. “Smallness of cans remaining associated was
in the gut of the canoe.”) (’aba’a´ı´gio can often be
translated as “only,” but the full morphological
breakdown shows that it is not really equivalent in
meaning to “only,” nor does it share the full range
of meanings of “only.”)
There are, however, two words, usually occurring in
reference to an amount eaten or desired, ba´aiso ‘whole’
and gı´ia´i ‘part’, which by their closest translation equiv-
alents might seem to be quantifiers:
14. a. tı´oba´hai hi ba´ -a





“The child wanted/s to eat the whole thing.” (lit.
“Child muchness/fullness eat is desiring.”)
b. tı´oba´hai hi gı´i -a´i
This content downloaded  on Wed, 6 Feb 2013 08:05:39 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
everett Cultural Constraints on Piraha˜ Grammar F 625
child he that -there
kohoai -so´og -ab -agaı´
eat -desiderative -stay -thus
“The child wanted/s to eat a piece of the thing.”
(lit. “Child that there eat is desiring.”)
Here ba´aiso and gı´ia´i are used as nouns, but they can
also appear as postnominal modifiers:
15. a. tioba´hai hi poogaı´hiaı´ ba´aiso
child he banana whole
kohoai -so´og -ab -agaı´
eat -desiderative -stay -thus
“The child wanted/s to eat the whole banana.”
(lit. “Child banana muchness/fullness eat is
desiring.”)
b. tı´oba´hai hi poogaı´hiaı´ gı´ia´i
child he banana piece
kohoai -so´og -ab -agaı´
eat -desiderative -stay -thus
”The child wanted/s to eat part of the banana.”
(lit. “Child banana piece eat is desiring.”)
Aside from their literal meanings, there are important
reasons for not interpreting these two words as quanti-
fiers. First, their truth conditions are not equivalent to
those of real quantifiers. In the following examples some-
one has just killed an anaconda and upon seeing it, utters
16a. Someone takes a piece of it, and after the purchase
of the remainder the content of 16a is reaffirmed as 16b:
16. a. ’a´oo´i hi pao´hoa’ai ’isoı´
foreigner he anaconda skin
ba´aiso ’oaboi -haı´
“whole” buy -relative certainty
“The foreigner will likely buy the entire ana-
conda skin.”
b. ’aio´ hi ba´aiso ’oaob
affirmative he “whole” buy
-a´ha´ hi ’ogio´
-complete certainty he bigness
’oaob -a´ha´
buy -complete certainty
“Yes, he bought the whole thing.”
In the English equivalent, where the same context is
assumed, when the statement “He will likely buy the
whole anaconda skin” is followed by the removal of a
piece in full view of interlocutors, it would simply be
dishonest and a violation of the meaning of “whole” to
say, “He bought the whole anaconda skin,” but this is
not the case in Piraha˜.
Next, there is no truly quantificational-abstraction us-
age of ba´aiso ‘whole’:
17. ∗Ti ’ı´si ba´aiso ’ogabagai
I animal “whole” want,
gı´ia´i ’ogi -hiaba
piece want -negative
“I prefer whole animals to portions of animals.” (lit.
“I desire [a] whole animal[s], not piece[s].”)
Sentences like this one cannot be uttered acceptably in
the absence of a particular pair of animals or instructions
about a specific animal to a specific hunter. In other
words, when such sentences are used, they are describing
specific experiences, not generalizing across experiences.
It is of course more difficult to say that something does
not exist than to show that it does exist, but facts like
those discussed here, in the context of my nearly three
decades of regular research on Piraha˜, lead me to the
conclusion that there is no strong evidence for the ex-
istence of quantifiers in Piraha˜.
Given the lack of number distinctions, any nominal
is ambiguous between singular, plural, and generic in-
terpretation. This can lead to interpretations which seem
quantificational:
18. tı´ ’iı´bisi hi baiai -hiaba
I blood-one he fear -negative
“I am not afraid of beings with blood.”
19. kaoa´ı´bogi hi sabı´ ’a´agaha´
evil spirit he mean is (permanent)
“Evil spirits are mean.”
On the surface it looks as if these were quantificational
phrases. They are of course ambiguous between singular
reading (e.g., “I am not afraid of that being with blood”)
and plural readings (“Those evil spirits are mean”) in
addition to the generic, more quantificational readings
given here. Although there is no word “all” in Piraha˜, it
could be countered that perhaps it is the construction
itself that produces the universal quantifier reading. Su-
perficially this is appealing, but I think that it is another
manifestation of the translation fallacy. Even though
there is a certain “quantificational smell” here, the truth
conditions are not the same for generics as for quanti-
ficational readings (see, e.g., Krifka et al. 1995). In fact,
I and others who have visited the Piraha˜ have misun-
derstood statements like these and/or their literal trans-
lations because we do translate them into Western lan-
guages as generic, universal quantification. These never
mean that all beings with blood, for example, fail to in-
spire fear. That there are always exceptions is understood
by the utterer and the hearer. It seems, though, that such
sets conform to the postulate of cultural constraint on
grammar and living because they are bounded by im-
mediate experience (e.g., “evil spirits I know about”) and
thus are not fully intensional. Rather, each member of
the set has to be inspected to see whether it is an evil
spirit or being with blood and, if so, whether it is like
other such beings.
In 1980, at the Piraha˜’s urging, my wife and I began a
series of evening classes in counting and literacy. My
entire family participated, with my three children (9, 6,
and 3 at that time) sitting with Piraha˜ men and women
and working with them. Each evening for eight months
my wife would try to teach Piraha˜ men and women to
count to ten in Portuguese. They told us that they
wanted to learn this because they knew that they did
not understand nonbarter economic relations and
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wanted to be able to tell whether they were being
cheated. After eight months of daily efforts, without ever
needing to call them to come for class (all meetings were
started by them with much enthusiasm), the people con-
cluded that they could not learn this material, and clas-
ses were abandoned. Not one learned to count to ten,
and not one learned to add 3 1 or even 1 1 (if regularly
responding “2” to the latter is evidence of learning)—
only occasionally would some get the right answer. This
seemed random to us, as indeed similar experiences were
shown to be random in Gordon’s (2004) research.
Riverboats come regularly to the Piraha˜ villages during
the Brazil nut season. This contact has probably been
going on for more than 200 years. Piraha˜ men collect
Brazil nuts and store them around their village for trade.
They know all the traders by name and consider some
more honest than others (their judgments in this regard
always agreeing with judgments I formed later on my
own) on the basis of the quantity of items they receive
for the nuts they trade. A Piraha˜ man will present what-
ever it is that he has to “sell,” whether Brazil nuts, raw
rubber, sorva, or wood, to the owner of the riverboat.
The Brazilian will ask in Portuguese, “What do you
want, my son?” The Piraha˜ responds in Portuguese,
“Only Father [i.e., the riverboat owner] knows.” The Pir-
aha˜ call all riverboat owners Papai, “Father,” when di-
rectly addressing them but use Piraha˜ names for them
(which are usually pejorative, e.g., “No Balls”) when dis-
cussing them.7 It is not clear that the Piraha˜ understand
even most of what they are saying in such situations.
None of them seems to understand that this exchange
involves relative prestige. Their Portuguese is extremely
poor, again, but they can function in these severely cir-
cumscribed situations. They will point at goods on the
boat until the owner says that they have been paid in
full.8 They will remember the items they received (but
not exact quantities) and tell me and other Piraha˜ what
transpired, looking for confirmation that they got a good
deal. There is little connection, however, between the
amount they bring to trade and the amount they ask for.
For example, someone can ask for an entire roll of hard
tobacco in exchange for a small sack of nuts or a small
piece of tobacco for a large sack. Whiskey is what the
Piraha˜ men prefer to trade for, and they will take any
amount in exchange for almost anything. For a large
quantity (but usually after they are drunk) they will also
“rent” their wives or daughters to the riverboat owner
and crew (though, whatever transpires, the riverboat
owner should not leave with any women). In this “trade
7. Traders enjoy telling me how the Piraha˜ call them Papai and
love them like a father, but the Piraha˜ understand it quite differ-
ently. For one thing, in Piraha˜ “Father” can be used in reference to
someone one is dependent on, as in this case, where there is de-
pendency for trade items. Ultimately, to the Piraha˜, a foreigner with
goods seems to be seen as something like a fruit tree in the forest.
One needs to know the best way to get the fruit from it without
hurting oneself. There is no question of pride or prestige involved.
8. This is the patron-client system common in Latin America. The
trader always tells the Piraha˜ that they have overspent, with the
result that they are constantly indebted to him.
relationship” there is no evidence whatsoever of quan-
tification or counting or learning of the basis of trade
values. Piraha˜ living near the Trans-Amazon Highway
are far from Brazil nut groves, so they trade fish to passing
truck drivers and some settlers. In these cases they tend
to be much more aggressive because they know that they
are feared, and if they are not satisfied with the exchange
(and they never are in this situation, in my experience)
they simply return at night to steal produce from the
settler’s fields or any possessions not locked away.
It should be underscored here that the Piraha˜ ulti-
mately not only do not value Portuguese (or American)
knowledge but oppose its coming into their lives. They
ask questions about outside cultures largely for the en-
tertainment value of the answers. If one tries to suggest
(as we originally did, in a math class, for example) that
there is a preferred response to a specific question, they
will likely change the subject and/or show irritation.
They will “write stories,” just random marks, on paper
I give them and then “read” the stories back to me—
telling me something random about their day, etc. They
may even make marks on paper and say random Por-
tuguese numbers while holding the paper for me to see.
They do not understand at all that such symbols should
be precise (for examples, when I ask them to draw a
symbol twice, it is never replicated) and consider their
“writing” exactly the same as the marks that I make. In
literacy classes, we were never able to train Piraha˜ even
to draw a straight line without serious “coaching,” and
they were never able to repeat the feat in subsequent
trials without more coaching (partially because they saw
the entire process as fun and enjoyed the interaction but
also because the concept of a “correct” way to draw was
profoundly foreign).9
Finally, I agree that Piraha˜ and English are incom-
mensurate in several ways and that numbers and count-
ing are one very obvious manifestation of this incom-
mensurability, but it is not clear that linguistic
determinism provides the explanation we need. The rea-
son is that the absence of counting is simply one un-
expected absence in Piraha˜ language and culture. There
are various others, partially enumerated above, that,
when considered together, appear to result from a higher-
level cultural constraint or constraints. The constraint(s)
must be cultural, it seems to me, because, while there
does not seem to be any linguistic or cognitive com-
monality between the items, there is a cultural value
that they share, namely, the value of referring only to
immediate experience. If we accept this as a strong cul-
9. The end of the literacy classes, begun at the Piraha˜’s request (and
separate from the math classes already described), was as follows.
After many classes, the Piraha˜ (most of the village we were living
in, about 30 people) read together, out loud, the word bigı´ ‘ground/
sky’. They immediately all laughed. I asked what was so funny.
They answered that what they had just said sounded like their word
for ‘sky’. I said that indeed it did because it was their word. They
reacted by saying that if that is what we were trying to teach them,
they wanted us to stop: “We don’t write our language.” The decision
was based on a rejection of foreign knowledge; their motivation for
attending the literacy classes turned out to be, according to them,
that it was fun to be together and I made popcorn.
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table 1
World Color Survey Chart of Piraha˜ Color Terms
Symbol Term Gloss Users Basic Color Term
# bio3pai2ai3 black (extended) 25 
– ko3biai3 white (extended) 25 
 bi3i1sai3 red/yellow 25 
o a3hoa3saa3ga1 green/blue (green-
focused)
25 
tural constraint in Piraha˜, then the list of items is greatly
reduced because each involves quantification, which en-
tails abstract generalizations that range in principle be-
yond immediate experience, rather than qualification,
which entails judgments about immediate experience.10
Color Terms
According to the entry for Piraha˜ in Kay et al. (n.d.), based
on work by Steve Sheldon,
Mu´ra-Piraha˜ presents a stable stage IIIG/Bu system.
All four terms for black, white, red/yellow, and
green/blue are used by all speakers with clearly de-
fined ranges and very high consensus (100% maxi-
mum in all cases) in the term maps. There is also
considerable uniformity in the individual naming ar-
rays. No other terms were recorded in the naming
task.
The term for black, bio3pai2ai3 [Kay et al.’s foot-
note reads “The raised numerals following each syl-
lable indicate tone”] extends strongly into brown
and more weakly into purple, which may represent
the vestiges of an earlier black/green/blue range for
this term. The white term bio3pai2ai3 [the term
meant is ko3biai3] and red/yellow term bi3i1sai3 (the
latter focused in red and extended into purple) are of
interest in that they show signs of coextension in
yellow, both in the aggregate naming arrays and in
their ranges on the term maps. While focal yellow
(C9) is named bi3i1sai3 in the aggregates, both terms
include it in their ranges, as seen in the term maps.
Individual speakers vary in preference between these
two terms for inclusion of yellow. Grue is named
a3hoa3saa3ga1. Its term map indicates a focus in
green, and is extended into yellow by some speakers.
The proposed Piraha˜ color terms of Sheldon are given
in table 1. In fact, these are not morphologically simple
10. Now, of course, human cognition must be able to range beyond
immediate experience, and therefore my claim is not that the Piraha˜
cannot do this. I have no basis for such a claim (though experiments
to test this ability should be conducted). My claim is rather that
they do not express quantification in nearly as wide a range of
lexical or syntactic devices as in other languages.
forms. Three are not even words, as is shown by the
following morphological divisions and glosses:11
20. bii -o3pai2 ai3
blood -dirty/opaque be/do
“Blood is dirty.”









There are no color terms in Piraha˜. This conclusion is
not intended as an indictment of Sheldon’s claims. When
one is armed with a set of categories (e.g., the Berlin and
Kay [1969] model for color terms) and no other, it is
understandable that one finds what one can talk about—
that is, that a degree of linguistic relativity colors the
research of linguists. Also, because linguistics research
among the Piraha˜ is monolingual, there is no way to get
translations of any precision whatsoever for color terms,
number words, verb suffixes, etc. All meaning has to be
worked out by correlating context with utterance (in the
most extreme form of Quine’s [1960] gavagai-confront-
ing field researcher) and by simply learning enough of
the culture and language oneself to develop incipient
intuitions that guide further testing and reasoning.12
There is, however, a possible objection to the conclu-
sion that there are no color terms in Piraha˜. Paul Kay
(personal communication) suggests that if the Piraha˜ use
these phrases regularly in normal speech to describe ex-
11. Sheldon analyzes Piraha˜ as having three underlying tones. I have
argued elsewhere (Everett 1979) that it should be analyzed as having
only two tones, and I follow this analysis throughout the paper
except for this section. For these examples, taken from Sheldon’s
work, I use his tones.
12. This of course means that what I say about Piraha˜ semantics
is largely unreplicable unless the “replication” linguist learns to
speak the language.
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actly these colors and the related color “space,” then the
phrases themselves count as color terms. This is a dif-
ferent concept of color term from the one I had in mind
(namely, morphologically simple terms for colors), but
even if we grant Kay’s point mine remains the same: not
only are these phrases not simple color words but there
is no use of color quantification in Piraha˜ (e.g., “I like
red” or “I like red things.” At the very least, this absence
of morphologically simple color words and of quantifi-
cation (as in generalized quantifier theory, where noun
phrases may be used to denote sets of properties) using
color indicates that Piraha˜ color description is a very
different kind of thing from what our experience with
other languages would lead us to expect.
There have been no controlled experiments to show
whether the Piraha˜ distinguish colors as do speakers of
languages with color terms. However, I have asked them
about different colors on many occasions, and I have not
noticed any inability to offer distinct descriptive phrases
for new colors. Therefore, I expect that, in contrast to
the situation with numbers, the Piraha˜ would show good
ability to distinguish colors under controlled circum-
stances. This is likely because color is different from
number cognitively and culturally. But since neither
color nor number terms are found in Piraha˜, it is rea-
sonable to ask what color terms have in common with
numbers. Both are used to quantify beyond immediate,
spatio-temporally bound experience. If one has a concept
of “red” as opposed to immediate, nonlexicalized de-
scriptions, one can talk about “red things” as an abstract
category (e.g., “Don’t eat red things in the jungle” [good
advice]). But Piraha˜ refer to plants not by generic names
but by species names, and they do not talk about colors
except as describing specific objects in their own ex-
perience.
Pronouns
Piraha˜ has the simplest pronoun inventory known.
Moreover, it appears that all its pronouns were borrowed
recently from a Tupi-Guarani language, either the Lingua
Geral or Kawahiv (Tenharim or Parintintin) (see also Ni-
muendaju´ 1925). [The argument for borrowing may be
found in the electronic edition of this issue on the jour-
nal’s web page.] Somehow the grammar seems to have
gotten by without them,13 but even their current use
shows that they do not have the full range of uses nor-
mally associated with pronouns in other languages. For
example, Piraha˜ pronouns function very differently in
discourse from most pronouns. In a narrative about the
killing of a panther, the word for “panther” is repeated
13. It is possible that tones were used rather than free-form pro-
nouns, though the only use of tones currently on pronouns is to
distinguish “ergative” from “absolutive” in the first person (ti p
absolutive; tı´ p ergative). One reader of this paper found it “in-
conceivable” that there would have been no first-versus-second-
person distinction in the language at any point in its history. In
fact, however, Wari (Everett n.d.) is a language that currently lacks
any first-versus-second-person distinction.
in almost every line of the text. Only when the panther
dies is it replaced completely by the “pronoun” s-/is-,
which is simply the first syllable (s- is how it comes out
in rapid speech, like English “snot either” for “It is not
either”) of the word ’ı´si ’animal/meat’, which is what it
has become after death. This is strange in light of most
work (e.g., Givon 1983) on topic continuity in discourse,
and it is the common, perhaps exclusive pattern of pro-
noun-versus-proper-noun occurrence in Piraha˜ dis-
course. The Piraha˜ prefer not to use a pronoun to refer
to an entity, since this is using something ambiguous or
vague in place of a proper name. Pronouns are used rel-
atively little for marking the activities of discourse par-
ticipants. They are also not used as variables bound by
quantifiers. There is, for example, no Piraha˜ equivalent
to a “donkey sentence” (“Everyone who owns a donkey
beats it”). This reduced role for pronouns is striking. Not
only does it follow from the cultural constraint on gram-
mar but the absence of pronouns prior to their borrowing
seems likely. What “pronouns” in Piraha˜ are mainly used
for is verb agreement (Everett 1987).
In spite of my claim that variables play no active role
in quantification or the grammar of pronominals, one
reader has suggested that verbs and nouns are variables
because they are place-holders for large sets of objects.
In fact, although this proposal might work for other lan-
guages, it does not work for Piraha˜. First, there are only
90 verb roots in the Piraha˜ lexicon. In other words, verbs
are a closed lexical class, and this means that, rather than
learn them as variables, the Piraha˜ can learn them as
constants, one by one. Moreover, the combination of
verbs is largely constrained by culture. Further, it is un-
necessary to consider nouns variables, since there is no
nominal morphology and since the appearance of nouns
in the syntax can be determined semantically rather than
morphologically, meaning that the behavior of nouns
could be determined by their individual meanings rather
than their role as variables. Thus both nouns and verbs
behave more like constants than variables in Piraha˜.
Lack of Embedding
One more unusual feature of Piraha˜, perhaps the strang-
est of all, is the absence of clear evidence for embedding.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that Piraha˜ lacks embed-
ding altogether. Let us begin by considering how the
function of clausal complements is expressed in Piraha˜
without embedding. English expresses the content of
verbs such as “to say,” “to think,” and “to want” as
clausal complements (here the use of a subscript s labels
the embedded clauses as theory-neutral): “I said that
[sJohn will be here],” “I want [syou to come],” “I think
[sit’s important].” In Piraha˜ the contents of such verbs,
to the degree that equivalent verbs exist at all, are ex-
pressed without embedding:
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24. ti ga´i -sai ko´’oı´ hi kaha´p -iı´
I say -nominative name he leave -intention
“I said that Ko´’oı´ intends to leave.” (lit. “My saying
Ko´’oı´ intend-leaves.”)
The verb “to say” (ga´i) in Piraha˜ is always nominal-
ized. It takes no inflection at all. The simplest translation
of it is as a possessive noun phrase “my saying,” with
the following clause interpreted as a type of comment.
The “complement clause” is thus a juxtaposed clause
interpreted as the content of what was said but not ob-
viously involving embedding. Piraha˜ has no verb “to
think,” using instead (as do many other Amazonian lan-
guages [see Everett 2004]) the verb “to say” to express
intentional contents. Therefore “John thinks that . . .”
would be expressed in Piraha˜ as “John’s saying that. . . .”
English complement clauses of other types are handled
similarly in Piraha˜, by nominalizing one of the clauses:
25. a. hi ob -a´a’a´ı´ kahai kai -sai
he see -attractive arrow make -nominative
b. kahaı´ kai -sai hi
arrow make -nominative he
ob -a´a’a´ı´
see -attractive
c. ∗hi kahaı´ kai -sai
he arrow make -nominative
ob -a´a’a´ı´
see attractive
“He knows how to make arrows well.” (lit. “He
sees attractively arrow-making.”)
There are two plausible analyses for this construction.
The first is that there is embedding, with the clause/verb
phrase “arrow make” nominalized and inserted in direct-
object position of the “matrix” verb “to see/know well.”
The second is that this construction is the paratactic
conjoining of the noun phrase “arrow-making” and the
clause “he sees well.” The latter analysis seems to fit
the general grammar of Piraha˜ better. This is because as
an object the phrase “arrow-making” should appear be-
fore the verb, whereas here it follows it. And, whereas
normally there is optional clitic agreement available
with any direct object, there is never any clitic agreement
with such “object complement clauses” in Piraha˜ (Ev-
erett 1988). Further, although the order of “complement”
and “matrix” clauses can be reversed, the “embedded”
clause can never appear in direct-object position.
Further evidence of the analysis is the corresponding
interrogative form:
26. hi go´ ’igı´ -ai
he information question associate -do/be
kai -sai hi ’ob -a´a’a´ı´
make -nominative he see -attractive
“What [thing/kind of] making [does he] know
well?” (lit. “He what associated making sees
well?”)
27. ∗hi go´ ’igi -ai ’ob -a´a’a´ı´ kai -sai
“What thing [does he] know well to make?” (lit.
“What associated thing he knows well to make/
making?”)
In a question about 25, the order of the clauses must
be that in 26. This follows if there is no embedding,
because the interrogative word must always be initial in
the phrase and because the appearance of the entire
clause/phrase at the front of the construction means that
the question of extraction from within an embedded or
other phrase does not arise. We can, indeed should, in-
terpret 26 as the questioning of a constituent of the ini-
tial clause “arrow-making” and not of an embedded con-
stituent of the clause “he knows x well.”
Some readers may still find it difficult to accept the
idea of analyzing nominalized clauses of the type just
mentioned apart from embedding because the two are so
closely associated in many languages (see Koptjevskaja
Tamm 1993). Nominalization is, however, neither a nec-
essary nor a sufficient condition for embedding, and an
embedding analysis fails to account for multiple embed-
dings (why can’t multiple nominalized or other types of
subordination occur in any sentence?) and for the ex-
traction and word-order facts. At the same time, a close
semantic unit is formed by certain juxtaposed clauses,
and the nominalization is accounted for by the principle
of immediacy of information encoding, which is stated
in terms of utterances rather than clauses.
Other “subordinate” clauses similarly show no evi-
dence of embedding:
28. ti kobai -baı´ ’a´oo´i hi
I see -intensive foreigner he
’ı´kao -ap -a´p -iig -a´
mouth -pull -up -continuative -declarative
“I really watch[ed] the foreigner fishing [with line
and hook].” (lit. “I watch the foreigner intently.
He was pulling [fish] out by [their] mouths.”)
29. ∗hi go´ ’igı´
he information question associate
-ai hi ’ı´kaoapa´piiga´ hi
-do/be he fish he
kobai -baı´ ’a´oo´i
see -intensive foreigner
“What did he pull out by the mouth you watched
intently?”
30. hi go´ ’igı´
he information question associate
-ai hi kobai -baı´
-do/be he see -intensive
’a´oo´i
foreigner
“What did he see the foreigner do?/Why did he
watch the foreigner?”
Example 29 is ungrammatical because there is no re-
lation that can be understood to obtain between the two
clauses. It is asking a question about one clause and mak-
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ing a statement with the other. Since they are not in the
same sentence, however, they just come across as un-
related, at least to judge by the looks of incomprehension
and lack of interpretation that native speakers face in
such elicited constructions. In contrast, 30 is acceptable
because it is simply asking about what someone
watched; the answer could be a clause or a noun phrase.
Now consider how temporal clauses are handled:
31. kohoai -kaba´ob -a´o ti





“When [I] finish eating, I want to speak to you.”
(lit. “When eating finishes, I speak-almost want.”)
There is almost always a detectable pause between the
temporal clause and the “main clause.” Such clauses
may look embedded from the English translation, but I
see no evidence for such an analysis. Perhaps a better
translation would be “I finish eating, I speak to you.”
The similar conditional that follows uses nominaliza-
tion:
32. pii -boi -sai ti
water vertically move -nominalizer I
kahapi -hiab -a
go -negative -declarative
“If it rains, I will not go.” (lit. “Raining I go not.”)
Both 31 and 32 are best analyzed as simple juxtapo-
sition of two clauses. There is a clear semantic depen-
dency, but this does not necessarily translate into a syn-
tactic relation. The only ways I know to ask questions
about them are “When will you want to speak to me?”
and “Why won’t you go?”
Piraha˜ has no relative clauses proper. However, it does
have a co-relative clause (Everett 1986, 1992):
33. ti bao´sa -a´pisı´ ’ogabagaı´. Chico
I cloth -arm want. name
hi goo´ bag -a´oba
he what sell -completive
Here there is a full sentence pause between the verb
’ogabagaı´ ‘want’ and the next clause. The two sentences
are connected contextually, but this is not embedding.
Each is an independent, well-formed sentence. The sec-
ond sentence, on its own, would be a question, “What
did Chico sell?” In this context, however, it is the co-
relative.
Finally, “want”-like embeddings are handled in Piraha˜
by a desiderative suffix on the verb, with no evidence of
biclausality:
34. ’ipo´ihiı´ ’ı´ gı´ kobai -soog
woman she you see -want
-abagaı´
-frustrated initiation
“The woman wants to see you.”
Let us now consider two other potential cases of em-
bedding in Piraha˜, possession and modification:
35. ∗ko´’oı´ hoagı´ kai ga´ihiı´ ’ı´ga
name son daughter that true
“That is Ko´’oı´ ‘s son’s daughter.”
36. ∗kao´oı´ ’igı´ai hoagi kai ga´ihiı´ ’ı´ga
who son daughter that true
“Whose son’s daughter is that?”
Neither the declarative (35) nor the interrogative (36)
form of recursive possession is acceptable. No more than
one possessor per noun phrase is ever allowed. Removing
one of the possessors in either sentence makes it gram-
matical. A cultural observation here is, I believe, im-
portant for understanding this restriction. Every Piraha˜
knows every other Piraha˜, and they add the knowledge
of newborns very quickly. Therefore one level of pos-
sessor is all that is ever needed. If further identification
is called for, say, in the case of a foreign family, then an
extra phrase is juxtaposed:
37. ’ı´saabi kai ga´ihiı´ ’ı´ga
name daughter that true
ko´’oı´ hoagı´ ’aisigı´ -aı´
name son the same -be
“That is ’ı´saabi ‘s daughter. Ko´’oı´’s son being the
same.”
Here the juxtaposition makes it clear that ’ı´saabi is
Ko´’oı´’s son.
Very rarely, one encounters multiple modification in
natural discourse and elicited material. A typical ex-
ample is as follows:
38. gahio´o ’ogiı´ biı´sai hoı´
airplane big red two
-hio ’ao -’aaga´
there possess -be
“There are two big red airplanes.”
There seems no need to analyze this as embedding, how-
ever. It is merely, as in previous cases, juxtaposition,
stringing out a small number of adjectives in a specified
order (e.g., size  color  quantity). There is no ambig-
uous modification resulting from multiple “attachment”
possibilities as in English “old men and women.” The
ambiguity here is usually understood as the result of
attaching “old” to either the noun phrase containing
“men and women” or the lower noun phrase containing
only “men.” Since there is no way for “old” to be at-
tached uniquely to “women,” the third ambiguity (in
which only women would be old) is ruled out. However,
Piraha˜ never allows such conjunction of noun phrases
with modifiers. Rather, the equivalent in Piraha˜ would
be:
39. ’ogi -a´ag -ao´ toı´o
big -be -thus old
-’aaga´ ’igihı´ ’ipo´ihiı´ pı´aii
-be man woman also
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“Everyone (lit. “people bigness”) is old. Men and
women too.”
Once again, 39 involves juxtaposition. This is further
supported by the ability to repeat the modifier “old” in
the following construction:
40. ’ogia´agao´ toı´o’aaga´ ’igihı´ toı´o’aaga´
big old man old
’ipo´ihiı´ toı´o’aaga´ pı´aii
woman old also
“Everyone (lit. “people bigness”) is old. Men and
women too.”
There is likewise no evidence for embedding in Piraha˜
morphological structure. Although the complexity of the
verb is very high, with perhaps more than 16 suffix clas-
ses, there is nothing about its semantic composition,
stress, or morphological attachment that requires re-
course to the notion of embedding to account for Piraha˜
morphology. The system, however complex, can be ac-
counted for by a “position class” analysis along the lines
of Everett (1986), in which individual morphemes occupy
linearly arranged, semantically distinguished slots.
If indeed there is no embedding in Piraha˜, how might
this lack be related to cultural constraint? Embedding
increases information flow beyond the threshold of the
principle of immediacy of information encoding. Al-
though Piraha˜ most certainly has the communicative
resources to express clauses that in other languages are
embedded, there is no convincing evidence that Piraha˜
in fact has embedding, and, as we have seen, positing it
would complicate our understanding of question for-
mation. This would follow from the principle of im-
mediacy of information encoding, which I take to be the
iconic principle constraining the grammar’s conformity
to cultural constraint.14
Tense
I have argued elsewhere (1993) that Piraha˜ has no perfect
tense and have provided a means for accounting for this
fact formally within the neo-Reichenbachian tense
model of Hornstein (1990). This is an argument about
the semantics of Piraha˜ tense, not merely the morpho-
syntax of tense representation. In other words, the claim
is that there is no way to get a perfect tense meaning in
Piraha˜, not merely an absence of a formal marker for it.
Piraha˜ has two tenselike morphemes, -a ‘remote’ and
-i ‘proximate’. These are used for either past or present
events and serve primarily to mark whether an event is
in the immediate control or experience of the speaker
(“proximate”) or not (“remote”).
In fact, Piraha˜ has very few words for time. The com-
plete list is as follows: ’ahoapio´ ‘another day’ (lit. ‘other
at fire’), pi’ı´ ‘now’, so’o´a´ ‘already’ (lit. ‘time-wear’), hoa
‘day’ (lit. ‘fire’), ahoa´i ‘night’ (lit. ‘be at fire’), piia´iso ‘low
14. Peter Culicover (personal communication) suggests that Pir-
aha˜’s lack of embedding is a kind of linguistic “fossil.”
water’ (lit. ‘water skinny temporal’), piibigaı´so ‘high wa-
ter’ (lit. ‘water thick temporal’), kahai’aı´i ’ogiı´so ‘full
moon’ (lit. ‘moon big temporal’), hiso´ ‘during the day’
(lit. ‘in sun’), hiso´ogia´i ‘noon’ (lit. ‘in sun big be’), hibi-
gı´baga´’a´iso ‘sunset/sunrise’ (lit. ‘he touch comes be tem-
poral’), ’ahoakohoaihio ‘early morning, before sunrise’
(lit. ‘at fire inside eat go’).
Absolute tenses are defined relative to the moment of
speech, which is represented as “S” in the Hornstein-
Reichenbach system (see also Comrie 1985). The event
or state itself is shown as “E.” Relative tenses are rep-
resented by the linear arrangment of S and E with respect
to the point of R(eference) for E. Thus, for example, the
tenses of English can be represented in this system as
follows (where a comma p simultaneous and __ p pre-
cedes [see Hornstein 1990 and Everett 1993 for details]):
S, R, Ep present tense; S__R, Ep future tense; E, R__S
p past tense; E__R__Sp past perfect; S__E__Rp future
perfect; E__S, R p present perfect.
To account for Piraha˜’s lack of the perfect, I have sug-
gested that [R] is parameterized, with [-R] as the default
value. Children would set it at [R] just in case they
heard a perfect-tense utterance or, perhaps, a perfect-
tense interpretation. I have also pointed to the connec-
tion between the absence of an R-point in the semantics
of Piraha˜ tense system and the lack of concern with
quantifying time in Piraha˜ culture. I have argued that
formal grammars require that any noncoincidental con-
nection in this regard be Whorfian; language must influ-
ence culture, since otherwise children would have to
learn their culture in order to learn their grammar, an
order of acquisition proscribed in Chomskyan models.
However, in the context of the present exploration of
culture-grammar interactions in Piraha˜, it is possible to
situate the semantics of Piraha˜ tense more perspica-
ciously by seeing the absence of precise temporal refer-
ence and relative tenses as one further example of the
cultural constraint on grammar and living. This would
follow because precise temporal reference and relative
tenses quantify and make reference to events outside of
immediate experience and cannot, as can all Piraha˜ time
words, be binarily classified as “in experience” and “out
of experience.”
When the Piraha˜ hear a boat coming, they will line up
on the riverbank and wait for it to come into sight. They
will say, “The boat ’ibipı´o (‘arrived’).” They will watch
a boat disappear around the corner and say, “The boat
’ibipı´o (‘left’).” When a match is lit, they say that the
match ’ibipı´ai (where -ai is the verb form and -o the
incorporated form).15 They will repeat the same expres-
sion when the match goes out. They especially use this
for a flickering match and love to watch one, saying
“Keep on ’ibipı´ai.” After discussions and checking of
many examples of this, it became clearer that the Piraha˜
15. Verbal events are also culturally restricted in Piraha˜, but verbal
“incorporation” (the stringing together of several verb roots [Everett
1986: section 18] to form another verb), is quite common. For “ar-
rival” and some other events, there are always multiple verb roots
incorporated. For “match flicker,” however, there is only the single
verb ’ibipiai.
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are talking about liminality—situations in which an
item goes in and out of the boundaries of their experi-
ence. This concept is found throughout Piraha˜ culture.
Piraha˜’s excitement at seeing a canoe go around a river
bend is hard to describe; they see this almost as traveling
into another dimension. It is interesting, in light of the
postulated cultural constraint on grammar, that there is
an important Piraha˜ term and cultural value for crossing
the border between experience and nonexperience.
Kinship Terms
Piraha˜’s kinship system may be the simplest yet re-
corded. An exhaustive list of the kinship terms is the
following (unless specifically mentioned, there are no
gender distinctions): ’ahaigı´ ‘ego’s generation’, tioba´hai
‘any generation below ego’, baı´’i ‘any generation above
ego/someone with power over ego,’16 ’ogiı´ ‘any gener-
ation above ego/someone with power over ego’ (lit.
‘big’), ’ibı´gaı´ ‘usually two generations above ego or more
but overlaps with baı´’i and ’igiı´’ (lit. ‘to be thick’), hoagı´
‘biological son’ (lit. ‘come next to’), hoı´sai ‘biological
son’ (lit. ‘going one’),17 kaai ‘biological daughter’ (a
house is a kaaiı´i ‘daughter thing’), piihı´ ‘child of at least
one dead parent/favorite child’.18
Is it a coincidence—another one—that this kinship
system is found in Piraha˜, given the other facts we have
been discussing? Or could it be of a piece with all that
we have seen, another effect of the cultural constraint
on grammar and living? The latter seems the most eco-
nomical and satisfying explanation. Kinship terms refer
only to known relatives; one never refers to relatives
who died before one was born. During one four-week
period in 1995 I worked exclusively on trying to build
a genealogy for an entire village. I could not find anyone
who could give the names of his/her great-grandparents,
and very few could remember the names of all four
grandparents. Most could only remember (or would
only give) the names of one or two grandparents. I was
able to include names back four generations for my
main informant, but that was only because there were
two unusually old Piraha˜ (both women) in the village
who could remember two grandparents each. The sim-
ple fact is that the kinship terms conform exactly to
the principle of immediacy of experience.
Since kinship and marriage constraints are closely
related in most societies, it is worth mentioning the
effects of this simple kinship system on Piraha˜ marriage
relations. Not surprisingly, in light of this system, mar-
16. Whether this is related to the use of Portuguese Papai ‘father’
in dealing with traders I do not know, though I suspect that it is.
I am not sure which came first.
17. These two terms for “son” appear to be synonyms; I have never
been able to discover any difference between them in texts, direct
questions, indirect observations, etc., and they seem to be used with
equal frequency.
18. It seems to have both of these meanings simultaneously, though
different people use it in different ways, some favoring the former,
some the latter.
riage is relatively unconstrained. Piraha˜ can marry close
relatives. I have seen adults I knew to share a biological
parent marry and have been told that this is not rare,
but I have never seen a marriage between full biological
siblings.
This raises the additional question of how the Piraha˜
distinguish between just anyone at their generation and
biological siblings, which they seem to do pretty well
despite the fact that children not uncommonly switch
families and are occasionally (especially orphans) raised
by the village. The nominal suffix gı´i ‘real’ or ‘true’ can
be added to most nouns, including kinship terms: ’a´oo´i
‘foreigner’, ’a´oo´i-gı´i ‘Brazilian’ (lit. ‘real foreigner’—the
ones they knew first), ’ahaigı´ ‘same generation’,
’ahaigı´–gı´i ‘biological sibling’ (lit. ‘real sibling’).
Absence of Creation Myths and Fiction
The Piraha˜ do not create fiction, and they have no cre-
ation stories or myths. This contrasts with information
that we have on the related language, Mura. Nimuen-
daju´ (1948) is not the only one to have observed that
the Mura people have a rich set of texts about the past.
All of this field research, however, was carried out in
Portuguese and is therefore difficult to evaluate. If we
had texts in the Mura language, it would be easier in
principle to verify (e.g., by grammatical and topical de-
vices) the authenticity of the texts or whether they
might have in fact been borrowed. In any case, it seems
unavoidable that Mura, a dialect closely related to Pi-
raha˜, had texts about the distant past, perhaps fables,
some legends, and other fiction (and, in Portuguese, ac-
cording to some anthropologists [see Oliveira 1978], it
still has such texts).19
I have attempted to discuss cosmology, the origin of
the universe, etc., with the Piraha˜ innumerable times.
They themselves initiate many of these discussions, so
there is no question of any reluctance to discuss the
“true story” with me as an outsider. In the early days,
before I spoke Piraha˜, I would occasionally try to use
Portuguese to elicit the information. Often this or that
19. The quality of anthropological research on Piraha˜ varies. Several
anthropologists (see esp. Gonc¸alves 1990, 2001; Oliveira 1978; Oliv-
eira and Rodrigues 1977; Roppa 1977) have done a reasonable job
of describing aspects of Piraha˜ culture, but a previous description
of the kinship system (Oliveira 1978), weakened by the researcher’s
inability to speak the language, contains confusions between cli-
ticized possessive forms of a particular kinship term and distinct
kinship terms. The longer-term studies of Piraha˜ cosmology and
naming by Gonc¸alves are the most reliable ever done by an an-
thropologist, but one simply cannot come to the best conclusions
about Piraha˜ meanings working through the medium of the very
poor Portuguese of Piraha˜ informants. Gonc¸alves based much of
his research on work with two Piraha˜ informants whose Portuguese
was somewhat better than that of most Piraha˜ because they had
been taken away from the village as boys and lived for several years
with Brazilians along the Madeira River until they were discovered
and restored to their people, but even their Portuguese was insuf-
ficient for getting at the meanings of terms as they emerge both
from the culture and especially from the very complex morpho-
logical structure of Piraha˜.
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Piraha˜ informant would tell me (in Portuguese) that
they had stories like this and would even tell me bits
and pieces, which I thought were similar to Christian
stories or Tupi legends common in that part of Brazil
(e.g., the widespread beliefs about river porpoises and
dolphins, especially the pink dolphin, emerging from
the rivers at night to take on human form and go in
search of women to marry, rape, and so on). Indeed, now
that I speak Piraha˜, I know that even among themselves
the Piraha˜ repeat and embellish these stories. But there
are no indigenous creation myths or fiction any longer,
if indeed they ever existed, and there is not a single
story about the ancient past told by any Piraha˜ other
than bits and pieces of Tupi and Portuguese stories (not
always acknowledged as such). When pressed about cre-
ation, for example, Piraha˜ say simply, “Everything is
the same,” meaning that nothing changes, nothing was
created. Their talking about the stories of other cultures
can be best understood, it seems to me, as “mention-
ing” texts that they have experienced qua texts rather
than “using” them to discuss or explain anything in
the world around them or the ancient world. They are
like oral-literary theorists in their telling and discus-
sion of the texts of others. Nimuendaju´ (1948), though
easily collecting myths from the Mura, was unable to
collect them from the Piraha˜. No one ever refers to a
mythical figure, story, or concept in normal conversa-
tion, and when questioned directly about creation Pi-
raha˜ claim that the way things are is the way they have
always been.
Discussion
We have seen that the gaps observed in Piraha˜—the ab-
sence of number, numerals, or a concept of counting and
of terms for quantification, the absence of color terms
and embedding, the extreme simplicity of the pronoun
inventory, the lack of a perfect tense, the simplicity of
the kinship system, the absence of creation myths, the
lack of individual or collective memory of more than
two generations past, and the absence of drawing except
for extremely crude stick figures representing the spirit
world claimed to have been directly experienced follow
from the postulate of the cultural value of immediacy of
experience that constrains grammar and living. Piraha˜
thus provides striking evidence for the influence of cul-
ture on major grammatical structures, contradicting
Newmeyer’s (2002:361) assertion (citing “virtually all
linguists today”), that “there is no hope of correlating a
language’s gross grammatical properties with sociocul-
tural facts about its speakers.” If I am correct, Piraha˜
shows that gross grammatical properties are not only
correlated with sociocultural facts but may be deter-
mined by them.
What does this mean for the nature of human language
or, at least, for Piraha˜ as a normal human language? It
is useful in this regard to review the well-known design
features of human language proposed by Hockett (1960):
vocal-auditory channel, broadcast transmission and di-
rectional reception, rapid fading, interchangeability, total
feedback, specialization, semanticity, arbitrariness, dis-
creteness, displacement, productivity, duality of pattern-
ing, traditional transmission. The three features that
stand out in particular here are interchangeability, dis-
placement, and productivity.
To the degree that Piraha˜ lacks a concept of counting,
it is incommensurate in that semantic or cognitive do-
main with languages that have such a concept. I suspect
that there are other domains of Piraha˜ in which inter-
changeability is also absent, but in the domain of count-
ing the lack of interchangeability can be considered es-
tablished (see Gordon 2004). I submit that the evidence
is sufficient in this case to conclude that this design
feature is not uniformly inviolable.
With regard to displacement, I believe that the facts
above show that it is severely restricted in Piraha˜ as a
cultural principle. Piraha˜ of course exhibits displacement
in that people regularly talk about things that are absent
from the context at the time of talking about them, but
this is only one degree of displacement. The inability in
principle to talk about things removed from personal
experience (for example, abstractions of the type repre-
sented by counting, numbers, quantification, multi-
generational genealogies, complex kinship, colors, and
other semantic/cultural domains discussed above) shows
that displacement in Piraha˜ grammar and language is
severely constrained by Piraha˜ culture.
Productivity is also shown to be severely restricted by
Piraha˜ culture, since there are things that simply cannot
be talked about, for reasons of form and content, in Pi-
raha˜ in the current state of its grammar.
The implications of all this for the enterprise of lin-
guistics are as follows:
1. If culture is causally implicated in grammatical
forms, then one must learn one’s culture to learn one’s
grammar, but then, contra Chomsky (2002), a grammar
is not simply “grown.”
2. Linguistic fieldwork should be carried out in a cul-
tural community of speakers, because only by studying
the culture and the grammar together can the linguist
(or ethnologist) understand either.
3. Studies that merely look for constructions to inter-
act with a particular thesis by looking in an unsophis-
ticated way at data from a variety of grammars are fun-
damentally untrustworthy because they are too far
removed from the original situation. Grammars, espe-
cially those of little-studied languages, need an under-
standing of the cultural matrix from which they emerged
to be properly evaluated or used in theoretical research.
4. Particulars can be as important as universals. This
is so because each culture-grammar pair could in prin-
ciple produce tensions and interactions found nowhere
else, each case extending our understanding of the in-
teraction of culture and grammar.
Now let us consider a final unusual feature of Pi-
raha˜—that the Piraha˜ continue to be monolingual in
Piraha˜ after more than 200 years of regular contact
with Brazilians and other non-Piraha˜. New light is
shed on this question by the preceding discussion,
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conforming to many of the Piraha˜’s own narrative ex-
planations of this fact. Simply, Portuguese is incom-
mensurate with Piraha˜ in many areas and culturally
incompatible, like all Western languages, in that it
violates the immediacy-of-experience constraint on
grammar and living in so many aspects of its structure
and use. The Piraha˜ say that their heads are different.
In fact, the Piraha˜ language is called ’apaitı´iso ‘a
straight head’, while all other languages are called
’apaga´iso ‘a crooked head’. Our discussion here, I be-
lieve, helps us to understand this as more than a pa-
rochial ethnocentrism. Given the connection between
culture and language in Piraha˜, to lose or change one’s
language is to lose one’s identity as a Piraha˜—hiaitı´ihı´,
‘a straight one/he is straight’.
Conclusion
Though Piraha˜ is an extreme case, it teaches us some-
thing about the deep loss inherent in the death of any
language, even if the people survive. When Portu-
guese-speaking Muras visit the Piraha˜ today, the Pi-
raha˜ do not envy them. They see them as simply sec-
ond-rate, false Brazilians. The Piraha˜ say, “We are not
Brazilians. We are Piraha˜.” Without their language or
their culture, they would fail to be Piraha˜. Their lan-
guage is endangered because they themselves are en-
dangered by the ever more intrusive presence of set-
tlers, Western diseases, alcohol, and the inexorably
changing world that we live in. This beautiful lan-
guage and culture, fundamentally different from any-
thing the Western world has produced, have much to
teach us about linguistic theory, about culture, about
human nature, about living for each day and letting
the future take care of itself, about personal fortitude,
toughness, love, and many other values too numerous
to mention here. And this is but one example of many
other endangered languages and cultures in the Am-
azon and elsewhere with “riches” of a similar nature
that we may never know about because of our own
shortsightedness. The need is more urgent than ever
for field researchers to document these languages and
for more individuals and foundations to follow the
lead of the Hans Rausing Endangered Languages Doc-
ument Project and donate to support research on them.
For advocates of universal grammar the arguments
here present a challenge—defending an autonomous
linguistic module that can be affected in many of its
core components by the culture in which it “grows.”
If the form or absence of things such as recursion,
sound structure, word structure, quantification, nu-
merals, number, and so on is tightly constrained by a
specific culture, as I have argued, then the case for an
autonomous, biologically determined module of lan-
guage is seriously weakened.
An alternative view that has been suggested by some
readers of this paper, namely, that the gaps in Piraha˜
discussed above are a result of a lack of “conceptual
structure”—in other words, that the Piraha˜ are sub-
standard mentally—is easily disposed of. The source
of this collective conceptual deficit could only be ge-
netics, health, or culture. Genetics can be ruled out
because the Piraha˜ people (according to my own ob-
servations and Nimuendaju´’s have long intermarried
with outsiders. In fact, they have intermarried to the
extent that no well-defined phenotype other than stat-
ure can be identified. Piraha˜s also enjoy a good and
varied diet of fish, game, nuts, legumes, and fruits, so
there seems to be no dietary basis for any inferiority.
We are left, then, with culture, and here my argument
is exactly that their grammatical differences derive
from cultural values. I am not, however, making a
claim about Piraha˜ conceptual abilities but about their
expression of certain concepts linguistically, and this
is a crucial difference.
As I mentioned in the beginning, the constraint
against discussing things outside of immediate expe-
rience could have cognitive as well as grammatical
effects. For example, cognition is directly implicated
in the claims of Gordon (2004) regarding the lack of
counting in Piraha˜, and one could argue that cognition
might be further implicated in each of the “gaps” and
unusual features of Piraha˜ grammar. One might also
investigate the possibility that culture affects the cog-
nitive abilities and/or schemas available to members
of Piraha˜ society. Pending future research, I am pre-
pared to make only two very modest claims about Pir-
aha˜ cognition. First, if I am correct that the Piraha˜
cannot count (something that will require much more
experimentation to determine), then it is likely that
this is due to the long-term effects of the cultural con-
straints discussed above. Gordon (2004) alludes to a
Whorfian approach to the matter by claiming that Pi-
raha˜’s lack of counting might derive from their lack
of number words, but many societies in the Amazon
and elsewhere have borrowed number words as they
develop economic ties that require numerical abilities.
The hypothesis of this paper, which explains both the
lack of counting and the lack of borrowing, is that
Piraha˜’s counting “deficiency” and their failure to bor-
row number words (in spite of commercial contact
with Brazilians and in spite of borrowing their pro-
nouns) are due to cultural constraints. Second, if the
Piraha˜ show additional cognitive deviations from
Western expectations with regard to, for example,
color identification, ability to interpret multiply em-
bedded structures, or relative tense concepts (all mat-
ters that require careful, culturally appropriate psy-
chological experimentation), then these would seem
most economically understood in terms of cultural
constraints as well. Thus what the paper has labored
most intensely to establish, namely, that Piraha˜ cul-
ture constrains Piraha˜ grammar, also predicts that the
effect of this constraint could eventually affect cog-
nition as well.
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Everett argues that Piraha˜ violates three of Hockett’s
(1960) universal design features of language—inter-
changeability, displacement, and productivity. As im-
portant as this suggestion might be, the major thrust of
his article is that “culture can be causally implicated in
the linguistic structure of the language.” Seen in this
light, his paper is the most recent contribution to a grow-
ing literature that challenges the dogma that there is no
causal correlation of “a language’s gross grammatical
properties with sociocultural facts about its speakers”
(Newmeyer 2002:361).
The sociocultural facts in this case are drawn from the
Piraha˜, a small indigenous society that exhibits one of
the simplest cultures reported for lowland South Amer-
ica. This cultural simplicity, Everett proposes, is mani-
fest linguistically by what he calls “gaps” in the Piraha˜
language—for example, absence of a concept for counting
and terms for quantification, of linguistically simple
terms for color of syntactic subordination, and of perfect
tense. These features, among others, are commonly
marked in the languages of societies considered cultur-
ally complex in terms of standard measures such as those
of Carneiro (1970), Murdock and Provost (1973), Naroll
(1956), Hays (2000), and Marsh (1956). However, Everett
is careful to point out that “no one should draw the
conclusion from this paper that the Piraha˜ language is
in any way ‘primitive,’” calling attention to its highly
complex verbal morphology and prosody (features that
he fails to note are also typical of the languages of small,
local societies with simple cultures).
Everett’s proposals make his paper one of the most
controversial to be published in anthropological linguis-
tics in many years, perhaps since the appearance of Swa-
desh’s The Origin and Diversification of Language
(1971). However, his general hypothesis has a long his-
tory that can be traced to much of the nineteenth- and
twentieth-century literature on the languages of so-
called primitive peoples. Le´vy-Bruhl’s chapter on nu-
meration in How Natives Think, for example, opens with
the observation that “in a great many primitive peoples
. . . the only names for numbers are one and two, and
occasionally three. Beyond these, the native says ‘many,
a crowd, a multitude’” (1926:181). The multiple cases he
cites closely mirror the system described by Everett for
Piraha˜ and confirmed by Gordon (2004). Thus, Everett’s
claim that “Piraha˜ is the only language known without
number, numerals, or a concept of counting” is probably
an overstatement. What is important is that Everett’s
and Gordon’s research is sure to lead to field studies
aimed at replicating it, providing new experimental (ver-
sus anecdotal) evidence on numerical cognition in pre-
literate societies.
Piraha˜ is also not the only language known without
embedding. Foley (1986:177) describes the absence of re-
cursion in Iatmul (New Guinea), where verbs “do not
function as embedded parts within a whole, but are
linked to a fully inflected verb in a linear string, much
like beads on a necklace. . . . Linking of clauses is at the
same structural level [nonhierarchical] rather than as
part within whole.” This grammatical feature has also
been noted to be correlated with cultural complexity.
The best-known work is Givo´n’s proposal of “pragmatic”
and “syntactic” modes of speech that reflect changing
functions of language with cultural evolution, leading
him to conclude that “certain types of languages—those
which have only coordination (‘clause chaining’) but no
subordination—are found only in preliterate ‘societies of
intimates’” (Givo´n 1979:306; for detailed discussion see
Kay 1972; Mithun 1984; Kalma´r 1985; Pawley 1987; De-
salles 2004; Newmeyer 2002, 2004; Wray and Grace n.d.).
A final example of research that firmly supports Ev-
erett’s conclusions on the correlation of cultural com-
plexity and specific properties of grammar is Perkins’s
(1992) important work on deixis. In a wide-ranging cross-
linguistic study, Perkins demonstrates conclusively that
languages spoken in simpler societies commonly mark
deictic distinctions by complex internal grammatical
processes while languages spoken by more complex so-
cieties mark deictic distinctions syntactically.
The concrete specificity of obligatory deictic distinc-
tions is also a distinguishing characteristic of the gram-
mars of the languages of nonliterate societies. Examples
are seen in the Piraha˜ evidentials for specific knowledge
-hı´ai ‘hearsay’, -xa´agaua´ ‘observed’, -sibiga ‘deduced’,
-a´ti ‘uncertain’, -haı´ ‘relatively certain’, -ha´ ‘certain’ (Ev-
erett 1986) and in Wari spatial demonstratives cwa’ ‘this:
m/f’, ca’ ‘this:n’, ma’ ‘that:prox:hearer’, cwain ‘that:m/
f:distal’, cain ‘that:n:distal’ (Everett and Kern 1997,
Everett n.d.).
Everett’s paper will stimulate fieldwork on little-
known languages spoken by societies with simple cul-
tures. It will serve as a catalyst for new research that
will contribute to nonuniformitarianist approaches of
language evolution (see Newmeyer 2002, 2004; Chris-
tiansen and Kirby 2003; Hurford, Studdert-Kennedy, and
Knight 1998; Knight, Studdert-Kennedy, and Hurford
2000; Wray 2002; Carstairs-McCarthy 1999) Perhaps it
will also lead those engaged in investigations of the lin-
guistic relativity-determinism hypothesis to add an evo-
lutionary dimension to their efforts at demonstrating the
constraints of culture on the grammatical properties of
language. As Hymes has stated, “Only the renewal . . .
of an evolutionary perspective can enable linguistic the-
ory to connect languages and lives in a way that satisfies
the concerns among linguists for relevance of their in-
tellectual work and that satisfies the needs of mankind”
(1971:v–vi).
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Pursuing the issues of “cultural constraint,” “univer-
sals,” and “absences” would draw attention away from
what I take to be the central question in Everett’s article,
that of the role of experience in the construction of gram-
mar and its possible transpositions to the Amazonian
cultural and cosmological context. I shall seek to engage
with this question.
Seeger (1981:21), inspired by Le´vi-Strauss’s Mytholo-
giques (especially 1964:chap. 1), identified the basis of
an Amazonian cosmology as follows: “A cosmology is
expressed in more than the abstract thought of idle
minds; material things and human relations are also ex-
pressions of principles that may be expressed elsewhere
as abstract thoughts.” Viveiros de Castro (1986:252, 253;
1992) also calls attention to a possible conceptualization
of cosmology specific to the Amazon, emphasizing that
“cosmology” does not necessarily imply a balanced and
harmonious system saturated with meaning. Therefore,
the idea of “absolute postulates” that would engender
fields of perception and modes of acting in and concep-
tualizing the world or that presuppose existence without
experience would not be applicable to Amazonian cul-
ture and cosmology. Overing (1996), in translating the
concept of “performative” to the Amazonian universe,
proposes the term “generative” to accentuate the im-
portance of experience for those ontologies, given that it
is the appropriate act that generates relations. This is a
particular mode of constructing social relations and ways
of thinking about the world that is based on a specific
capacity—always personalized, that is, derived from ex-
perience—to produce culturally acceptable things. Basso
(1995:149) pointed out that the importance of stories for
the Kalapalo consisted not in their representing collec-
tively accepted images that animate social life but, on
the contrary, in their describing the experiences of in-
dividuals exploring alternatives for their lives. Even in
narratives that seem fixed, such as myths and songs, one
can discern an important process of individualization
that accentuates experience as the basis of this percep-
tion, frequently reflected in the first-person telling of the
narrative. Other writings, such as those of Oakdale (2002:
165–66) and Lagrou (1998), demonstrate that for the Kay-
abi and the Cashinahua understanding of the meaning
of songs depends upon a contextualized interpretation of
the metaphors used in them. Urban (1989:40) points out
that for the Xavante the first-person narratives of myths
produce a trancelike state in which the narrator begins
to experience the narrative in an individualized way. My
research on the Piraha˜ highlights the importance of ex-
perience in the way that the Piraha˜ represent the world.
My book Unfinished World: Action and Creation in an
Amazonian Cosmology seeks to demonstrate that the
world is constituted through action and creation, de-
pending structurally upon experience for its construc-
tion. For the Piraha˜, experience “is fundamental to con-
stituting a perception of the cosmos because it is that
which describes, links words and objects, observations
and their explanations, thought and act. Within this con-
ception, to gain the status of an organized discourse the
cosmos depends upon someone who lives it, who ex-
periences it” (Gonc¸alves 2001:32). The importance of ex-
perience in the constitution of Amazonian “culture” was
summarized very well by Gow (1991:151): “I take lit-
erally what native people say about distant ascendant
kin, which is that they do not know anything about them
because they never saw them. This is noted by numerous
other ethnographers of Native Amazonian culture, but
usually thought to show the ‘shallow time frame’ of
these societies. . . . The shallow time frame of these
societies is not a product of their failure to accumulate
information in deep genealogies, but rather a result of
their stress on personal experience in epistemology.” If
the Piraha˜ are not a cultural exception within the Am-
azonian context, they most likely are not a linguistic
exception either. It is up to Amazonian linguists to en-
gage with Everett’s provocative argument and to rethink
the grammar of Amazonian languages in terms of the
value that experience assumes in its definition.
paul kay
International Computer Science Institute, 1947 Center
St., Berkeley, CA 94704, U.S.A. (kay@cogsci.berkeley.
edu). 2 v 05
Despite the very broad interest of this paper, I must re-
strict my comments to a single aspect, color terminol-
ogy. I will suggest (1) that although not all languages have
a set of color terms that jointly name all the colors (Lyons
1995, Kay and Maffi 1999, Levinson 2000), given the Pi-
raha˜ concern with concrete, immediate experience we
might expect Piraha˜ to do so and (2) that Piraha˜ may.
Thus, although I find reason to doubt Everett’s conclu-
sion that Piraha˜ has no color terms, I believe that their
actual presence would support his broader claims re-
garding Piraha˜ predilection for immediate experience.
1. Experience of color is about as direct as experience
gets. I refer here not to reified color concepts such as
that figuring in a sentence like “Red is exciting” but to
directly perceived color sensation, as expressed in a sen-
tence like “I want the red apple.” Everett (personal com-
munication) states that Piraha˜ color expressions are used
in the latter way and not the former—that is, that they
are used as modifiers or predicates but not as substan-
tives. Hence, I claim, Piraha˜ color expressions convey
immediate sensations, not abstract concepts. Linguisti-
cally, color terms exemplify a rare, arguably unique lex-
ical field in that its distinctions are directly traceable to
complex peripheral neural structures—in the retina. Hu-
man color vision is probably shared throughout the ca-
tarrhine primates (De Valois et al. 1974, Sandell, Gross,
and Bornstein 1979), and it is generally held that the
trichromatic system of the catarrhines coevolved with
red or orange ripe fruit (Mollon 1989, Regan et al. 2001).
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Humans’ immediate experience of color is in all likeli-
hood the same as that of apes and Old World monkeys.
Color sensations would appear to qualify as exemplifying
“direct, concrete experience” if anything does.
2. Everett’s conclusion of “no color words” is based in
part on the formal complexity of the Piraha˜ color ex-
pressions and in part on his impression that Piraha˜ color
naming is highly variable. With regard to syntactic com-
plexity, an example is , literally ‘immature3 3 3 1a hoa s aa ga
be.temporary’, which the World Color Survey field lin-
guist Stephen Sheldon found to be a widely shared term
meaning “green-or-blue with a focus in green.” It is fairly
common in the world’s languages for a word meaning
“green” (or “green-or-blue”) to be closely related to a
word meaning “immature” or “unripe” (for example, En-
glish and all the Celtic languages), but this pattern is not
universal. One cannot predict that an expression mean-
ing “immature” will also mean “green” or “grue.” Ev-
erett writes as two words; Sheldon writes3 3 3 1a hoa s aa ga
it without a space, indicating that he sees it as a single
word like forget-me-not, jack-in-the- pulpit, or burnt si-
enna. The first two examples are English plant terms
and the third is an English color term, their internal
syntactic complexity (and the vagaries of orthography)
notwithstanding.
With regard to possible variability of Piraha˜ color ex-
pressions, Everett cites “interspeaker variation in nam-
ing colors” in partial support for his view that the color
expressions in question are “fully compositional
phrases” (personal communication). Given the long and
intimate experience of Dan and Keren Everett with every
aspect of Piraha˜ life and language, this opinion merits
respect. At the same time, it runs directly counter to the
systematic work of Sheldon in exposing 25 Piraha˜ speak-
ers to 330 colored stimuli for naming in a fixed random
order and then eliciting their best-example judgments
from a palette showing all the colors at once. Sheldon’s
results show strong consensus on the roster of Piraha˜
color names and equally strong consensus on the specific
ranges of colors they name and on their judgments of
best examples, although he notes that “there was dis-
cussion [during color-naming sessions] among everyone
. . . even though I asked them to do it individually with
me” (personal communication).
In deciding whether the Piraha˜ color expressions are
proper color terms, the issues are just two: (A) Are the
color meanings consensual and applicable to unfamiliar
objects that exhibit the color property (as well as familiar
objects)? (B) Are the color meanings not predictable from
the meanings of the words or morphemes that make up
the expressions and the rules of the language? If both
answers are yes, then these expressions are color terms.
The results of Sheldon’s investigation apparently yield a
yes answer to question A. Everett plans to repeat Shel-
don’s field experiment to see whether the consensual
result can be replicated (personal communication). With
regard to question B, it is clear from the analytical glosses
that Everett gives to the four Piraha˜ color expressions
that the color meanings of these expressions do not fol-
low from their compositional meanings: “temporarily
being immature” doesn’t mean “green-or-blue,” al-
though finding a word meaning “green or blue” that is
based on an expression that originally means “imma-
ture” or “unripe” is not uncommon.
Piraha˜ has color terms if the Sheldon results can be
replicated under better-controlled conditions. Presence
of true color terms would not be surprising in view of
the Piraha˜ preference for linguistic encoding only of di-
rect, concrete experience.
stephen c. levinson
Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Psycholinguistik, Postbus 310,
6500 AH Nijmegen, The Netherlands (stephen.
levinson@mpi.nl). 22 iv 05
There is a growing interest in human diversity through-
out the human sciences, but unequivocally establishing
the facts is a difficult and delicate business. Everett has
neither established the facts nor handled the rhetorical
delicacies that would be essential to establishing a
bridgehead for studies of linguistic and cultural diversity
among the universalizing sciences. In a nutshell, here
are the main criticisms:
1. The central proposition, roughly “Piraha˜ live in the
present,” is too vague to be supported by the ad hoc
collection of cultural features adduced. Nor does the ar-
gumentation remotely approach the standard of the clas-
sic anthropology on cultural coherence (e.g., Benedict
1934, Geertz 1960), let alone those set in modern lin-
guistic discussions (e.g., Enfield 2002).
2. Most of the features listed are not sufficiently well
established to satisfy the sceptics who should be the tar-
gets of this article. One simply has to take or leave the
various assertions, admitted to be “largely unreplicable,”
even though many of them have the weak logical char-
acter of statements of non-occurrence. Further, Everett
casts doubt on the fieldworking capacities of the only
other researchers who might have been marshalled in
defence of his claims. If something can be known, it can
be shown, and the duty of the researcher is to document
it.
3. It is far from clear that Piraha˜ is the only language
without a counting system (cf. Aboriginal languages of
Australia [Dixon 2002:67]) or the only language without
colour terms (cf. the controversies with, e.g., Saunders
and van Brackel 1997, Levinson 2000) or the only lan-
guage without embedding (cf. again Australian languages
[Hale 1976, Dixon 1995, Austin and Bresnan 1996] and
Nicaraguan sign language [Pyers n.d.]). That cultures
may systematically lack genealogical depth or visual art
has also long been noted (Goody 1993). What is meant
to count as further attestation only reveals further reason
for doubt: for example, earlier-documented colour terms
among the Piraha˜ are dismissed because the expressions
are compositional (e.g., “bloodlike”), but the current
work on colour terms does not treat this as exceptional
(see, e.g., Kay and Maffi 1999). The danger is that by
oversimplifying and claiming the uniqueness of individ-
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ual Piraha˜ cultural features the value of genuine obser-
vations about a unique complex of features will be lost.
4. Blatant inconsistencies likewise do nothing to re-
assure the reader. For example, we are told that the Pi-
raha˜ are monolingual, but we find that “often this or
that Piraha˜ informant would tell me (in Portuguese) that
. . .” and that Piraha˜ “have long intermarried with out-
siders,” suggesting sustained bilingualism. Elsewhere it
is stated that there are bilingual informants, although
their Portuguese is poor.
5. Having made the Piraha˜ sound like the mindless
bearers of an almost subhumanly simple culture, Everett
ends with a paean to “this beautiful language and cul-
ture” with “so much to teach us.” As one of the few
spokespersons for a small, unempowered group, he
surely has some obligation to have presented a more bal-
anced picture throughout.
All this is a pity, as I have little doubt that, due al-
lowances made, this human group lacks some of the
complexities that we think of as distinctive of the spe-
cies. One of the dubious truisms enshrined in the text-
books is that all human languages are equally complex
and equally expressive. Recently there has been exten-
sive discussion of what we should mean by complexity
in language and what the sources of variable complexity
might be (e.g., McWhorter 2001, Trudgill 2004). Embed-
ding the Piraha˜ case in this wider discussion raises the
question whether Piraha˜, represented (according to the
Ethnologue) by just 150 individuals, is not a creolized,
stripped-down remnant of some earlier, more complex
set of systems (as discussed in the literature on language
attrition and death [e.g., Sasse 1992]). Everett tries to head
off this interpretation but notes that the Piraha˜ were
once part of a powerful “Mura nation,” and the idea that
the pronoun system is borrowed indeed suggests some
intensive contact or language-shift situation.
Everett suggests that his analysis undercuts the neo-
Whorfian emphasis on the importance of language in
cognition (as in Lucy 1992b, Levinson 2003a, Majid et
al. 2004, and Gordon 2004), since he prefers an account
in terms of the causal efficacy of culture, but no one
interested in language diversity would make a simple
dichotomy between language and culture: a language of
course is a crucial part of a culture and is adapted to the
rest of it (see Levinson 2003a:316–25). The question that
neo-Whorfians are interested in is how culture gets into
the head, so to speak, and here language appears to play
a crucial role: it is learnt far earlier than most aspects of
culture, is the most highly practiced set of cultural skills,
and is a representation system that is at once public and
private, cultural and mental. It is hard to explain non-
ecologically induced uniformities in cognitive style
without invoking language as a causal factor (see Lev-
inson 2003a:chap. 7; 2003b).
Everett has missed an opportunity here to follow up
on interest generated by Gordon’s (2004) persuasive anal-
ysis of the Piraha˜ absence of numeracy: only with a sober
catalogue of carefully documented features would we be
in a position to ask whether they formed a larger pattern
and what the origins of that pattern might be.
andrew pawley
Department of Linguistics, RSPAS, Australian
National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
(apawley@coombs.anu.edu.au). 21 iv 05
Everett’s thought-provoking paper makes several strong
claims. I will first address those that seem to me to have
little merit and then turn to those to which I am more
sympathetic.
I don’t think Piraha˜ is a serious threat to Hockett’s
universal design features. Everett has misinterpreted two
of Hockett’s key terms. He takes “interchangeability”
to mean “intertranslatability”—that what can said in
one language can be said in any other. However, Hockett
(1958:578) defines “interchangeability” as a relation be-
tween speakers and hearers: any speaker of language X
can understand what someone else says in X and can say
the same things. Intertranslatability was not one of
Hockett’s universals. The point has been made very
forcefully by Grace (1987) and others that natural lan-
guages are far from fully intertranslatable. People cannot
readily talk about a subject matter when they do not
have the words, formulas, etc., that define the substance
of discourse about that subject matter. The more differ-
ent two cultures are, the fewer subject matters they will
have in common.
By “productivity” Hockett means being able to say
things that have never been said before. Piraha˜ clearly
has productivity in this sense. But Everett uses “pro-
ductivity” in a way that links it to full intertranslata-
bility (“Productivity is also shown to be severely re-
stricted by Piraha˜ culture, since there are simply things
that cannot be talked about, for reasons of form and con-
tent”), and languages are not fully intertranslatable.
Piraha˜ speech is said to exhibit only one degree of dis-
placement. The arguments for this claim are problem-
atic. It would seem that Piraha˜ has considerable appa-
ratus for talking about non-immediate experience but
that there is a strong cultural preference not to do so. To
assess the linguistic basis of the one-degree-of-displace-
ment claim would require a well-founded scale of ab-
stractness and careful examination of polysemy and var-
ious kinds of discourses by various speakers.
I am sympathetic to the view that parts of a language
are shaped by cultural values and practices. This is un-
controversial when it comes to lexical semantics, met-
aphor, pragmatics, and discourse structure but harder to
demonstrate in morpho-syntax (Enfield 2002). It is not
clear that the lexico-grammatical properties of Piraha˜
that Everett refers to are due specifically to the imme-
diacy-of-experience constraint. The stock of Piraha˜ verbs
can be extended by combining verb roots but only if the
sequence refers to a culturally accepted event. This con-
straint seems to be true of verb compounding and seri-
alization in all languages. It reflects a universal cultural-
cum-linguistic tendency for conventional concepts to get
lexicalized; people develop streamlined ways of saying
familiar things. Whether constraints on what it is con-
ventional to say are a matter of grammar, lexicon, or
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idiomaticity depends on how one chooses to define these
constructs (Pawley 1986).
Some other languages, for example, Warlpiri, have very
limited counting systems (one, two, many) and/or only
two basic color terms (light, dark), and/or no clear cases
of embedding, but in such cases there has been no sug-
gestion of an immediate-experience constraint (as speak-
ers have rich mythologies, easily learn European count-
ing systems, and so on). It is usual to give a utilitarian
explanation of these limitations. Here we run into the
perennial problem of functionalist explanations: How to
falsify them? How to avoid the suggestion of teleology?
If Piraha˜ behavior and thought are as Everett says—
and one craves a detailed ethnography of Piraha˜ speech
and social psychology, including documentation of in-
dividual variation—it may well be that something like
the immediate-experience constraint does underlie the
absence of myths, lack of interest in remote things, etc.
Compare the mind-set that makes many urban dwellers
indifferent to the plant species of their vicinity: a sample
of San Francisco Bay area residents had a range of from
just 10 to 34 tree/shrub names (Witkowski and Burris
1981) even though many more species were present. Why
do some people pay close attention to certain parts of
their environment and others not? It is too easy to say,
in this case, that “people attend to what is useful.” Typ-
ically, tribal peoples (and some others) know the salient
attributes not only of useful species but also of many
that are not useful. Established expertise in a domain
gives people a mind-set to be curious about many things
in that domain (see Berlin 1991 and Hays 1991 on “util-
itarian” versus “intellectualist” explanations of folk
taxonomies).
Everett’s claims about the connections between cul-
ture, subject matter preferences, and linguistic resources
raise a cluster of important issues of conceptual frame-
work and method. One conclusion of his I agree with
entirely. If linguists want reliable descriptions of ordi-
nary spoken languages, they need to do extended field-
work and immerse themselves in the cultural contexts
of language use.
alexandre surrall e´ s
Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Sociale (CNRS), Colle`ge
de France, 52 rue du Cardinal Lemoine, 75005 Paris,
France (alexandre.surralles@college-de-france.fr).
15 iv 05
Everett’s article confirms loud and clear what many an-
thropologists believe: to study language in isolation from
the context in which it is produced poses a high risk of
simplification. The most common is the projection of
categories alien to the language under study. For exam-
ple, to address colour-term systems or other classifica-
tory systems without previously questioning the config-
uration or even the relevance of these categories for a
given society is a practice (far too common in anthro-
pology for us to overlook when it appears in linguistic
studies) that leads to the fallacy of demonstrating the
reality of these categories for that society. Everett’s ar-
ticle illustrates that this and other universalistic reduc-
tionisms do not survive rigorous testing against the re-
ality of the practical usage of a given language. Although
I mostly agree with Everett’s critical work, I have some
reservations about the way it is formulated and espe-
cially about his alternative proposal. My main objection
is that he stresses the deficiencies of the Piraha˜ language
(the only positive feature of the language is a very rich
prosody developed only in an appendix) and says little
about how the users of this language communicate.
This could lead us to believe that the Piraha˜ do not
have developed communication because their language
does not permit it. However, I doubt that Everett believes
this in view of the way he defends himself against the
embarrassing impression of primitivism that his descrip-
tion of the Piraha˜ conveys. We could therefore conceive
that, far from lying in the structure of the language, the
problem arises from the historical conditions endured by
this community. In this respect the text is somewhat
contradictory. On the one hand it argues against the pos-
sibility of the language’s deficiencies’ constituting a faux
archaism, a consequence of the demographic weakness
and other traumas inflicted by an aggressive colonial en-
vironment, by asserting (although failing to demonstrate)
that the 200 years of contact were not especially incisive.
On the other hand, it presents as an argument for cul-
ture’s determining role on language the fact that the Pi-
raha˜ are monolingual despite all these years of regular
contact with Brazilians. If indeed this contact failed to
be influential, the Piraha˜’s monolingualism may mean
not that they were unable to learn Portuguese but that
they did not need to.
If Everett believes that the Piraha˜ have a high level of
communication despite the simplicity of their language,
he should demonstrate how they communicate. He pro-
vides us with a clue when he asserts the primacy of
culture over language and adds that the Piraha˜ “restrict
communication to the immediate experience of the in-
terlocutors.” However, he does not go into all the con-
sequences of his assertions, leaving his alternative pro-
posal to be vaguely intuited. He fails to tell us, for
instance, whether in the end the language exists for him
or, as Ingold (2000:392–93), believes, that it is only be-
cause of the reification of speech, made possible through
writing, that the idea of language as an entity (a collec-
tion of rules and signifiers with a generative potential)
exists in Western thought. If he does not agree with this
radical position, he should illustrate the use that the
Piraha˜ make of grammatical language, the meaning that
they give to it, and how they include it in other com-
munication practices such as the body language of feel-
ing and other sensory, polysensory, or synaesthetic forms
of nonverbal communication as some of us are attempt-
ing to do in the Amazon (Surralle´s 2003). These consti-
tute ways of communication related to the notion of
“immediate experience” that Everett suggests, that is,
experience that can be directly perceived.
These silences can be related to a general lack of eth-
nographic contextualization of the Piraha˜ linguistic data
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that is surprising coming from a linguist who seeks to
build bridges with anthropology. Everett devotes a num-
ber of paragraphs to the Piraha˜ ethnographic background,
but only as an introduction. Moreover, anthropologists
today work collectively on groups of societies rather than
on isolated units. Everett should consider in more depth
the ethnographic and linguistic descriptions of other
scholars working among the Piraha˜ and related groups
to convince us that his theses are not the result of a
personal bias in his data gathering, given that he offers
only his own data as evidence. In short, ethnographic
and linguistic analyses should require more scrupulous
integration. This void may be due to a slightly anach-
ronistic view of anthropology and of the notion of culture
associated with the discipline. Indeed, it seems that for
Everett “culture” encompasses everything but language.
He should bear in mind the decade of work that anthro-
pology, particularly in the Amazon (e.g., Descola 1994,
Viveiros de Castro 1998), has dedicated to criticizing the
notion of culture and the dichotomy that it establishes
with the notion of nature.
michael tomasello
Department of Developmental and Comparative
Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, D-04103 Leipzig,
Germany (tomas@eva.mpg.de). 17 iii 05
The best-kept secret in modern linguistics is that we
actually know where grammar comes from. Virtually all
of the so-called function words in a language have their
origin in content words such as nouns and verbs (de-
monstratives are an exception [Diessel 1999]). Case
markers and agreement markers most often originate in
freestanding words such as spatial prepositions, pro-
nouns, and even nouns and verbs. The English future
markers will and gonna are both derived from freestand-
ing verbs, and the definite article the is derived from a
demonstrative. Something similar can happen on the
level of whole syntactic constructions as loose discourse
sequences such as He pulled the door and it opened
become more tightly organized syntactic constructions
such as He pulled the door open (see Traugott and Heine
1991, Hopper and Traugott 1993, Bybee, Perkins, and
Pagliuca 1994).
Basically, as people communicate about content, con-
tent words need to be “glued together” to make coherent
messages fitting the cognitive and attentional capacities
and predispositions of human beings: such things as force
dynamic scenes (with agents and patients) to fit with
human causal/intentional cognition, topic-comment
structure to fit with human attentional needs, and prag-
matic grounding to help identify and locate objects and
actions in space and time. In other words, particular
things get grammaticalized in the way that they do be-
cause human cognition and communication work the
way that they do. The starting point of the process, of
course, is the particular content that people choose to
talk about in a particular linguistic community. And so
from the point of view of this functional-typological-
historical approach to language, Everett’s findings and
hypotheses make perfect sense. If members of a speech
community do not talk about events remote in time and
space, then there is no raw material to be transformed
into grammatical markers for such things as tense and
aspect.
I am no expert on the facts of the matter here. Perhaps
Everett’s specific analyses need revising in some partic-
ular ways. But the question is: from a large-scale theo-
retical point of view, what is the alternative? And the
answer is, as Everett notes, universal grammar. In my
experience, what normally happens when proponents of
universal grammar hear reports like Everett’s is that they
simply do not believe them. The nonembedded Piraha˜
sentence structures reported, for example, really do have
embedding, they will claim; it is just at an underlying
level where we can’t see it. The evidence for this claim
is that one could translate these nonembedded structures
into embedded structures in, for example, English. But
this is just “the Latin fallacy.” Sensible people stopped
analyzing other European languages by analogy to Latin
many years ago, and we should stop analyzing the struc-
tures of non-European languages by analogy to European
languages now. One of the most thoughtful analyses
along these lines is that of Comrie (1998), who argues
that what we translate from Japanese as relative clauses
really do not have the same structure and work quite
differently. Therefore, without arguing the particulari-
ties of the case Everett presents, it is perfectly reasonable
that the structures of the Piraha˜ language are very dif-
ferent from those of other languages. Because they talk
about different things, different things get grammat-
icalized.
In light of the fact that we know that languages differ
greatly in their syntactic structures and we know how
grammaticalization takes place in many specific in-
stances in particular languages, how can anyone main-
tain the hypothesis of a universal grammar? The answer
is to make the concept immune to falsification. Thus,
in universal grammar analyses, the most common prac-
tice is to invoke universal grammar without specifying
precisely what is intended, as if we all knew what it was.
Here are examples of what is said to be in universal
grammar from people who are bold enough to be specific:
O’Grady (1997) proposes that it includes both lexical and
functional categories. Jackendoff (2002) includes x-bar
syntax and the linking rules NP p object and VP p
action. Pinker (1994) agrees and adds “subject” and “ob-
ject,” movement rules, and grammatical morphology.
Crain and Lillo-Martin (1999) list wh- movement, island
constraints, the subset principle, head movement, c-
command, the projection principle, and the empty-cat-
egory principle. Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) point
to the computational procedure of recursion and Chom-
sky (2004) to the syntactic operation of “merge.” Baker
(2001), Fodor (2003), and Wunderlich (2004) all present
very different lists of features and parameters. There
seems to be no debate about which of these or other
accounts of universal grammar should be preferred and
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why. This problem is particularly acute in the study of
language acquisition, where there is no evidence that
children begin with the abstract linguistic categories
characteristic of most accounts of universal grammar
(Tomasello 2003).
Universal grammar was a good try, and it really was
not so implausible at the time it was proposed, but since
then we have learned a lot about many different lan-
guages, and they simply do not fit one universal cookie
cutter. Everett’s case is extreme, but there are others that
create similar problems for the theory. In science, when
theory and facts conflict, given a large enough body of
reliable facts, theory loses, and we must come up with
something new.
anna wierzbicka
School of Language Studies, Australian National
University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
(anna.wierzbicka@anu.edu.au). 1 iv 05
Because I fully agree with Everett’s general claim that
to a considerable degree culture shapes language and that
meaning is central to the understanding of both lan-
guages and cultures, I deplore all the more his extrava-
gant and unsubstantiated specific claims, which are
based on deeply flawed methodology and which ignore
the wide-ranging and methodologically rigorous studies
reported in Meaning and Universal Grammar (Goddard
and Wierzbicka (2002)—studies which have led to the
discovery of 65 universal semantic primes lying at the
heart of all languages.
Many of Everett’s claims about Piraha˜ are in fact en-
tirely consistent with the universals we have posited. At
the same time, some of these universals are alleged by
Everett to be absent from Piraha˜. For reasons of space, I
will focus here on “all,” whose alleged absence from
Australian languages I have discussed in detail (Wierz-
bicka (1996). The alleged absence of a word for “all” in
Piraha˜ is clearly refuted by the material cited by Everett
himself, and the failure to recognize its presence is a
glaring example of the weakness of the semantic analysis
in his paper.
Can one say things like “All the men went swimming”
in Piraha˜? The answer is clearly yes, as Everett’s ex-
amples (10) and (12) show. Concepts such as “every,”
“most,” and “few” are far from universal, but “all” does
occur in all languages, and Piraha˜ is evidently no excep-
tion. Everett does not see this: his interlineal gloss for
hiaitı´ihı´ hi ’ogi ‘all the [Piraha˜] people’ is “Piraha˜ people
he big.” The fact that the same segment used in one
syntactic frame can mean “big” and in another “all”
misleads him into thinking that there is no word for “all”
in Piraha˜—a conclusion clearly contradicted by his own
data. The concept of polysemy is a basic tool in semantic
analysis, and rejecting it altogether leads to ludicrous
results such as the following “literal” gloss: “My bigness
ate [at] a bigness of fish, nevertheless there was a small-
ness we did not eat.” In using such glosses, Everett ex-
oticizes the language rather than identifying its genu-
inely distinctive features. To say that ti ’ogi means,
literally, “my bigness” (rather than “we”) is like saying
that in English to understand means, literally, “to stand
under.” To deny that hi ’ogi means “all” is to make a
similar mistake.
In claiming that Piraha˜ has no word for “all,” Everett
is joining the long tradition of “primitive-thought”
scholars such as Hallpike (1979), who also claimed that,
for example, Australian Aborigines had no word for “all”
and, accordingly, were not capable of making generali-
zations. Everett insists that the Piraha˜ language is not
in any way “primitive,” but the fact of the matter is that
without a word (or wordlike element) meaning “all”
speakers could not make generalizations. Accordingly,
despite his protestations, Everett is presenting Piraha˜ as
“primitive” language.
Despite the sensational tone of Everett’s paper, most
of the other “gaps” that he sees in Piraha˜ are insignifi-
cant. Many languages lack numerals, and, as the Aus-
tralian experience shows, their speakers can readily bor-
row or develop them when they need them. What
matters is that the language does have words for the
universal semantic primes “one,” “two,” and “many.”
Out of these (and some other primes clearly present in
Piraha˜), all other numerals, quantifiers, and counting
practices can be developed. All the pronouns currently
used in Piraha˜ “were borrowed recently from a Tupi-
Guarani language,” but all languages have identifiable
exponents of “I” and “you,” and, whatever the source of
the current inventory, Piraha˜ is clearly no exception in
this regard. Piraha˜ has no colour words, but countless
other languages lack colour words, and the concept of
“colour” itself is culture-specific (cf. Wierzbicka 1996,
n.d.). What matters is that they all have the concept of
“see.” Again, as the Australian experience shows, speak-
ers of such languages can quickly build such concepts
when they become interested in the relevant technolo-
gies and practices.
Piraha˜ is no doubt “largely incommensurate with En-
glish,” but it is not fundamentally so: on the available
evidence, it has the same set of semantic primes, out of
which all other, culture-dependent, meanings can be
constructed. Boas and Sapir got it right: languages can
differ enormously in their semantic systems, but all evi-
dence points to what Boas called “the psychic unity of
mankind.” The universal semantic primes provide the
bedrock of that unity and a touchstone for linguistic
semantics.
Reply
daniel l . everett 1
Manchester, U.K. 18 v 05
The most important point of my paper is that evidence
for language evolution can be found in living languages,
1. I thank Brent Berlin, George Grace, Paul Kay, Alison Wray, Sally
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and therefore hypotheses such as universal grammar are
inadequate to account for the Piraha˜ facts because they
assume that language evolution has ceased to be shaped
by the social life of the species (e.g., Newmeyer 2002:
361). At the same time, this does not warrant labeling
different evolutionary paths more or less “primitive.”
I agree with Tomasello’s assessment of the issues and
Piraha˜’s place in the universal-grammar debate.
Berlin claims that other languages are known that lack
numbers and embedding, but I must disagree. Some lan-
guages have been claimed to have only “one,” “two,”
and “many,” but those are numbers.
Neither Hale (1976), Dixon (1995), nor any of the other
references cited by Pawley, Berlin, and Levinson claim
that any language lacks recursion, although Australian,
Papuan, and other languages often use nonsubordinating
clause-joining strategies where English, say, might use
recursion. Rachel Nordlinger’s work in progress supports
my point.
Gonc¸alves, who has spent roughly 18 months over a
period of several years living among the Piraha˜ and writ-
ten two books on Piraha˜ culture, accepts my claim that
experience guides culture and grammar in Piraha˜ and
connects it to more general work, initiated by Seeger
(1981), on Amazonian worldview. His remarks in this
regard are suggestive and useful.
Surralle´s’s principal objection to my paper is that it
appears to portray the Piraha˜ as communicatively defi-
cient. He rightly points out that there is a need for a
systematic ethnography of communication for Piraha˜,
but his objection (shared by Levinson) that I have por-
trayed the Piraha˜ as primitive in thought is ethnocentric.
That the language does not avail itself of grammatical
resources used in other languages neither renders it in-
ferior to other languages nor, as Levinson claims, makes
its speakers “mindless.” Surralle´s warns me against di-
chotomizing culture and nature, but I have tried to es-
tablish the opposite, namely, that cultural values shape
the language that ultimately emerges from them. My
paper should be taken as an argument for his position,
not against it.
Kay claims that Sheldon’s experiments, if accurate and
replicable, establish the existence of color terms in Pir-
aha˜ and that, in fact, the existence of color terms is har-
monious with my proposal that grammar is constrained
by experience. Sheldon (personal communication, April
2005) says the following about his experiments: “The
Piraha˜ like to participate together. I tried to keep things
separate, but even with the small study behind the
house, others come by to listen. The topic becomes of
immediate interest to everyone, and there was discus-
sion among everyone of what was being done, etc. I am
quite sure they discussed things among themselves even
though I asked them to do it individually with me.” He
adds that he agrees with the conclusion that I draw from
his work, namely, that the poor experimental control
raises potential problems with the interpretation of his
Thomason, Peter Ladefoged, Nigel Vincent, Ted Gibson, and
Jeanette Sakel for comments on this reply.
results because we are unable to say to what degree the
agreement on the color terms is the result of consensus
achieved through group discussion versus repeated in-
dividual use of the same terms independently. Therefore,
the experiments are contaminated and need to be rerun.
Further, Keren Everett has conducted informal tests
on Piraha˜ ability to name colors and has observed (per-
sonal communication, 2005) that speakers frequently
disagree on the description of colors. I have observed this
variation independently. Moreover, different phrases can
be used by the same speaker to describe the same color
in the same situation. For example, the particle ’igia´biı´
‘like’ is often used: pii ’igia´biı´ ‘blue’ (like water); bii ’ig-
ia´biı´ ‘red’ (like blood), etc. In addition, color terms can
vary according to what they describe, so that different
descriptions may be used for different objects, rather than
generalized color terms (e.g., black for animals, for hu-
mans, for inanimates): biopaı´ai ‘black’ (for a human; lit.
‘dirty blood’); kopaı´ai ‘black’ (for an animal; lit. ‘dirty
eye’); hoigii ’igia´biı´ ‘black/dark’ (usually for inanimates;
lit. ‘like dirty’).
I agree with Kay that color is an immediate sensation.
But the naming of it is not. A property name that gen-
eralizes over immediate expressions is an abstraction, a
variable. My claim is, again, that the Piraha˜ avoid this
(hence the near absence of adjectives and adverbs). Color
terms are abstractions; the descriptions of colors are not.
Abstractions violate the proposed principle of immedi-
acy; phrasal descriptions do not. My account predicts
that in Piraha˜ colors will be described by phrases ac-
cording to each experience rather than given variable-
like names (the latter might be possible, but only in vi-
olation of the proposed constraint).
Pawley says that I have misunderstood Hockett’s iner-
changeability design feature, but what Hockett (1958:
578) says it means is
that any participating organism equipped for the
transmission of messages in the system is also
equipped to receive messages in the same system,
and vice versa. For language, any speaker of a lan-
guage is in principle also a hearer, and is theoreti-
cally capable of saying anything he is able to under-
stand when someone else says it. Bee dancing and
gibbon calls also involve interchangeability, but our
other animal systems do not. In the courtship sig-
nalling of sticklebacks, for example, it is obvious
that the male and the female cannot change roles.
Nor can one imagine gazelles roaring and lions
fleeing.
Hockett’s gazelle-and-lion example doesn’t fit Paw-
ley’s understanding. What is at issue is a system of com-
munication across species, not within a species.
Pawley’s understanding of Hockett pivots on the
meaning of “same system.” He thinks that it means
“same language.” I claim that it means “same-species
communication system.” This difference of opinion may
be due to Hockett’s tendency to shift between properties
of “Language” and “A language.” The function of inter-
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changeability and his other design features is to identify
something specific about Homo sapiens. To do that it
must entail something at the species level rather than
at the individual language level. The evolutionarily in-
teresting understanding of interchangeability is therefore
just this: anything one can understand from a conspecific
one should be able to say to another conspecific. Bicul-
tural, bilingual individuals will in principle (though per-
haps not in practice) be able to communicate anything
they hear in either language, since they have fully un-
derstood it. But Hockett’s interchangeability, under my
interpretation, must be abandoned if Piraha˜ has followed
its own evolutionary path. Thus a Portuguese-fluent Pir-
aha˜ could not communicate perfect tenses in Piraha˜.
This limitation is connected to the question I raise re-
garding borrowing. Why are the Piraha˜ unlike other
groups in not borrowing number words? Further, why
are they still monolingual? Because their “core gram-
mar” lacks the resources to express certain concepts and
their culture prohibits certain ways of talking. My con-
clusion is thus a stronger argument against intertrans-
latability than even Grace’s (1987), which was based on
general principles.
Pawley also objects to my understanding of produc-
tivity. According to Hockett (1958:576) productivity
means that “a speaker may say something he has never
said nor heard before and be understood perfectly by his
audience, without either speaker or hearer being in the
slightest aware of the novelty.” On one level, this refers
strictly to combinatorics, but Hockett’s formulation it-
self must be revised, as I have argued, because it fails to
consider the vast variation in resources for productivity
available to individual languages. Piraha˜ shows that
there are severe limitations on “novelty” that are not
shared between languages. Although productivity is not
intertranslatability per se, the inadequacy of Hockett’s
conception of productivity is shown by the specific re-
strictions on intertranslatability that we see in my paper.
Interestingly, however, this reconsideration of produc-
tivity implies that there are multiple kinds of human
grammars.
Wierzbicka’s comments revolve around two asser-
tions: (1) her theory requires all languages to have the
quantifier “all” and (2) Piraha˜ does in fact have the word
“all.” Nothing she says, however, is relevant to deter-
mining whether Piraha˜ has “all” or not. All semanticists
know that the quantificational properties of a word are
revealed by its truth conditions. I have pointed out that
Piraha˜ has no word with the truth conditions of universal
quantification. Unless Wierzbicka can show that I am
wrong about the truth conditions, she has no case. The
same applies to her assertions on the Piraha˜ pronomin-
als. Further, her assertion that I have “primitivized” or
“exoticized” the Piraha˜ is based only on the idea that if
the properties of the language do not agree with her the-
ory it is primitive. But this is a nonsequitur. Finally, her
point about “all” is not unique to her. From a much older
tradition, Davidson says (2001[1997]:134–35) that the
“last stage” in language development
requires a leap; it introduces quantification, the con-
cepts expressed by the words “some” and “all.”
Once we advance to this stage, we have arrived at
languages that match, or begin to match, our own in
complexity. . . . It is here, in my opinion, that we
reach the degree of expressive sophistication that we
associate with thought, for it is only at this level
that there is positive evidence that the speaker of
the language can predicate properties of objects and
events.
By the Piraha˜ evidence both Davidson and Wierzbicka
are wrong. Thought need not be reflected directly in lan-
guage. The fact that the Piraha˜ lack the word “all,” using
instead, say, generics, means simply that their syllogistic
reasoning will nearly though not quite match our own,
giving them the ability to deal well with the world
around them but not to teach Western logic at this time
in their cultural history.
Levinson displays deep misunderstanding of my pro-
posed experience principle, claiming that it limits talk
to the present. As I have said, this principle includes
experiences over several generations. He further says
that the list of properties adduced in support of the prin-
ciple of immediate experience is disjointed. Whether any
list coheres is a matter not of taste but of argumentation.
Each feature listed is one that is highly unusual or unique
to Piraha˜. One can simply say that there is no link be-
tween them, or one can consider them as sharing the
property that they avoid violations of the experience
principle. This property creates an intensional, non-dis-
junctive set. Claims for disjointedness of the set of prop-
erties discussed must engage the evidence in favor of the
common property. Since Levinson fails to marshal a sin-
gle counterargument, his commentary makes no sub-
stantive contribution on this point.
Next, Levinson claims that my statement about the
Whorf hypothesis and formal theories is incoherent,
namely, that it is forced on formal theories just in case
a culture-language connection like Piraha˜ tenses is dis-
covered. Again, he does not say why. In fact, as I have
established in some detail (1993), according to universal
grammar children’s core grammar is insulated from cul-
tural influence, and therefore only a Whorfian hypothesis
is acceptable.
Levinson goes on to suggest that there is sustained
bilingualism among the Piraha˜, based on the statement
in my paper that there has long been intermarriage be-
tween the Piraha˜ and outsiders. Here he misunderstands
my point, but this is surely my fault for not explaining
“intermarriage” clearly enough. In the Piraha˜ case, in-
termarriage does not imply cohabitation; it in fact im-
plies only sexual relations. There is no off-the-shelf an-
thropological term that I am aware of for sexual relations
that are partly casual and partly intended to produce chil-
dren with non-Piraha˜ fathers (children of non-Piraha˜
women are never raised among the Piraha˜, only children
of Piraha˜ women). In such cases the name of the Brazilian
father—but a Piraha˜ name, not a Portuguese name—is
remembered. Sometimes, jokingly, the Brazilian may be
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referred to as the Piraha˜ woman’s husband, though he
receives no loyalty, no favors, no relationship at all.
There is not and never has been any sustained cohabi-
tation between Piraha˜ and Brazilians or other ethnic
groups. There is certainly no bilingualism, sustained or
otherwise. Readers need not take my unsupported word
for this; Peter Ladefoged, who visited the Piraha˜s with
me in 1995 to conduct phonetic research, had this to say
about them, after conducting field research on at least
50 other languages from around the world (Ladefoged
2005:154):
The only completely monolingual community I
have ever known are the speakers of Piraha˜, a small
group of about 300 people who live in the Amazo-
nian rain forest. They ignore strangers and have as
little to do with the outside world as possible. You
have to learn their language to speak to them, a te-
dious and difficult process involving hours of patient
observation and trial and error.
Levinson closes by asserting the persuasiveness of Gor-
don’s (2004) results. Here again I think that perhaps my
argument was insufficiently clear. Without wishing to
be unfair to Gordon, who certainly made a serious effort
to overcome the difficulties inherent in research with a
monolingual community, I must emphasize one crucial
point: on the videotape he made of his experimental set-
ting, the Piraha˜s say repeatedly that they do not know
what he wants them to do, and they have repeated these
comments since Gordon’s visits. Gordon did not realize
that they were confused because he was unable to com-
municate with them directly, and he did not request help
in interpreting the Piraha˜s’ comments on his experi-
ments. In addition, his experimental design was cultur-
ally insensitive. Even aside from methodological flaws,
there is an additional serious problem with Gordon’s in-
terpretation of his results: he does not attempt to account
for the fact that the Piraha˜ can and do fill other gaps in
their lexicon by borrowing words from other languages.
Levinson takes me to task for not discussing the work
of McWhorter (2001) and Trudgill (2004). Trudgill (2004)
was not available at the time I submitted my manuscript,
but now that I have read it, I can report that Trudgill’s
thesis and McWhorter’s where it is relevant are falsified
by the Piraha˜ data. Trudgill claims that simplification
(e.g., the Piraha˜ phonemic system) is more likely in
“communities involved in large amounts of language
contact.” This would mean, for example, that Piraha˜’s
unusual features could be due to disintegration through
contact. However, since Piraha˜ fits Trudgill’s (2004:306)
description of a “small, isolated, low-contact community
with tight social network structures,” it should have
more rather than less complexity. What this means is
that Trudgill is wrong. Better reasons for the simplicity
of Piraha˜ grammar and phonology have been presented
above.
Finally, Levinson exclaims that there is not enough
detail to assess my claims and that my claims are un-
replicable. First, almost all these claims have been in-
dependently established in publications listed in the pa-
per. Second, the claims are replicable—but only through
the Piraha˜ language.
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